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**Abstract**

This article analyzes the term “intersectionality” as defined by Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw (1989, 1991) in relation to the digital turn: it argues that intersectionality is the dominant framework being employed by fourth wave feminists and that is most apparent on social media, especially on Twitter.

This article analyzes the term “intersectionality” as defined by Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw (1989, 1991) in relation to the digital turn and, in doing so, considers how this concept is being employed by fourth wave feminists on Twitter. Presently, little scholarship has been devoted to fourth wave feminism and its engagement with intersectionality; however, some notable critics include Kira Cochrane, Michelle Goldberg, Mikki Kendall, Ealasaid Munro, Lola Okolosie, and Roopika Risam. Intersectionality, with its consideration of class, race, age, ability, sexuality, and gender as intersecting loci of discriminations or privileges, is now the overriding principle among today’s feminists, manifest by theorizing tweets and hashtags on Twitter. Because fourth wave feminism, more so than previous feminist movements, focuses on and takes up online technology, social media outlets like Twitter provide an unprecedented means for solidarity and activism; moreover, tweets can reach not only hundreds, but also tens of thousands, of people in a single moment (for example, #BringBackOurGirls and #fem2). This analysis references such broader examples as a means to contextualize the fourth wave, but for practical purposes is mostly concerned with the hashtag #solidarityisforwhitewomen. The popularity and polarizing effect of this hashtag underscores the feminist need for an online platform like Twitter because it serves as an instigative, activist tool amenable to intersectionality. Adopting intersectional feminism as my methodology, I argue that the fourth wave is characterized by an intersectional feminist framework, exemplified when analyzing the discourses on racism, feminism, and online representation presently taking place in the Twitter community.

Supplementing the lacuna in scholarship, in what follows, I provide a much needed genealogy and trajectory of fourth wave feminism, which situates the...
movement in relation to the first, second, and third waves. Fourth wave feminism, the foundation of which is laid by the works I outline in the first section, fights oppression like racism and sexism via an intersectional feminist lens that 1) considers social media (e.g., Twitter) an indispensable and essential tool and 2) strongly resists separating the offline from the online. Taking into account both race and gender as identity markers, the second section considers Crenshaw’s work over the last two and a half decades and develops a definition of intersectionality that is suitable for the fourth wave. In the third section, which makes up the majority of this article, I offer a detailed analysis of how the aforementioned hashtag #solidarityisforwhitewomen, by propagating meaningful and necessary critical dialogues on race, feminism, and online representation, evidences that intersectionality is the political impetus and theoretical framework employed by fourth wave feminists.

A Genealogy of the Fourth Wave

While many scholars, such as Judith Roof (1997), do not like a simplification of feminism into waves, this delineation proves useful when situating the fourth wave in North American and British feminism. Typically, the first wave fell between 1840 and 1920 (Phillips and Cree 2014, 936) and focused on women’s suffragism, legal rights (marriage, property), and political representation. The movement gained public momentum via speaking, demonstrations, militant protests, and incarcerations. The second wave, meanwhile, began roughly in the 1960s and centered on egalitarianism and activism related to 1) sexuality and reproductive rights; 2) wages, education, jobs, and domesticity; and 3) visibility in art, history, science, and other disciplines. In all three areas, “The personal is political,” became an important message for collective consciousness raising (Phillips and Cree 2014, 937). Unlike the first wave, which was predominantly fought by and for middle-class white women, the second wave crossed over into other identity markers and political demarcations, such as race, class, and sexuality, but arguably continued to marginalize these voices.

Confronting this marginalization head on, the third wave began in the 1980s with postmodern, cyber, anticolonial/postcolonial, and transnational perspectives (see, for example, hooks 1990; Haraway 1991; Spivak 1999; Mohanty 1988, 2002). Second wave feminist concepts, such as woman, oppression, and patriarchy, were perceived as problematically universalizing and essentializing. Distancing itself generationally from the second wave (see Walker 1992), the movement radically challenged binary, hierarchal positions as culturally constructed; for instance, the categories and constructions of sex and gender. The reconceptualization of sex and gender (including discourses on queerness and transgenderism), a decolonizing of feminism (calling for heterogeneity and a politics/complexification of location), and a reclaiming of femininity and beauty culture in the name of girl power or girlish feminism became key attributes of the third wave (Knappe and Lang 2014, 364). Additionally, early theorizations, particularly Donna Haraway’s (1986) groundbreaking work on the cyborg, launched a robust feminist inquiry into digital culture, cyberliterature, and cyberworlds.

Contrary to studies that trace the origin of the movement to 2008 (Baumgardner 2011, 250; Phillips and Cree 2014, 938), the fourth wave in fact commenced with the new millennium (see Kaplan 2003; Peay 2005; Daum 2006). Defined in relation to the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, psychotherapist and activist Kathlyn Schaaf, for example, began organizing women on her website Gather the Women as a call for world peace. Schaaf’s website on 9-11 prompted journalist Pythia Peay (2005) to claim, “the long-awaited ‘fourth wave’ of feminism [is]—a fusion of spirituality and social justice reminiscent of the American civil rights movement and Gandhi’s call for nonviolent change” (59). The term, however, did not reach a mainstream audience until 2008. In “The Feminist Reawakening: Hillary Clinton and the Fourth Wave,” Amanda Fortini (2008), a leading journalist, brought acute sexism and gender-centric issues to the forefront (42). The pernicious sexism Hillary Clinton experienced during her campaign to be the Democrat’s candidate in the US presidential bid, Fortini argues, (re)politicized many women and created a new anti-postfeminist collective consciousness (43). At this time, online representation and digital technology as the organizing and consciousness raising tool of the fourth wave feminist movement replaced 9-11-centric discussions.

Surprisingly, between the years 2008 and 2013, the movement gathered scant attention in academic and popular publications. Still in its early development,
scholars were quick to identify feminism online, but were reluctant to articulate exactly what the role of the internet and other digital technologies was, as Deborah Solomon (2009)’s interview with Jessica Valenti, co-founder with Vanessa Valenti of the most widely read feminism publication at the time Feministing.com, demonstrates. Consider Solomon surmising: “Maybe we’re onto the fourth wave now” and Valenti’s casual reply “Maybe the fourth wave is online” (n.p.). This skeptical attitude is also reflected in cultural critic Jennifer Baumgardner’s (2011) final chapter in F’ em! Goo Goo, Gaga, and Some Thoughts on Balls, which is titled “Is there a Fourth Wave?: Does it Matter?” At the end of her work, Baumgardner gestures briefly towards the fourth wave, arguing that it pursues “more or less the same goals of the third—reproductive justice, trans inclusion, sexual-minority rights, intersectionality, and the deconstruction of privilege—while utilizing social media and other burgeoning technologies to spread their activist message” (as paraphrased by Vogel 2014, n.p.). Noteworthy is that Baumgardner (2011) identifies that, unlike the previous waves’ experiences, fourth wavers’ experiences with digital technology is a given; they are born into a word that is already and always online (250). In “Feminism: A Fourth-Wave?,” Ealasaid Munro (2013) likewise questions whether a new wave, dependent on the internet for contemporary debate and activism, is in fact emerging (25). This makes one wonder if there is actually any distinct philosophical or ideological differences between the third wave and the fourth wave. Does the fourth wave have to have a self-awareness that “the medium is the message” (McLuhan 1964); that is, the message of the second and third wave was mostly limited to print books and “old-style models of political engagement like rallies and marches and displays of bra-burning” (Solomon 2009, n.p.), while the message of the fourth wave is now digital? It is certain that the message of feminism is changed by the medium, but the fourth wave, inevitably to be a new wave, must also distance itself ideologically.

Explaining how this digital technology constitutes a new wave for feminism, to reiterate, remained poorly expressed until Kira Cochrane (2013), published an essay in The Guardian titled “The Fourth Wave of Feminism: Meet the Rebel Women.” In this insightful article, Cochrane (2013) agrees with previous studies that the fourth wave is “defined by technology: tools that are allowing women to build a strong, popular, reactive movement online” (n.p.); and, today, one would be hard pressed to find a scholar who did not believe that social media, used as a public forum, is the defining feature of the new wave. Beginning with Cochrane’s ideas, written on the cusp of 2014, the movement has since gained momentum. Like Cochrane, current scholarship suggests the fourth wave is accomplished in part by a return to the street. That is, more so than the third wave, the fourth wave is energized by social and political activism: the fourth wave acknowledges that theory and a web presence alone is not enough to bring about political change.

Constituting a revitalizing of the second-wave’s street presence and the third wave’s foray into digital culture, the fourth wave takes advantage of digital technology, but maintains a presence on the ground; for example, Take Back the Night protests and marches, which began in the ’70s, have been rejuvenated. In the fourth wave, multiple co-existing consciousness raising platforms and social justice movements like Take Back the Night and Slut Walk are thus animating the movement. Cochrane (2013) confirms this relationship by providing several examples of feminist movements across the United Kingdom sprouting up and flourishing and she shows how feminist organizations are networking and disseminating information to a wide audience in unprecedented ways. The wave, according to writers like Cochrane, takes full advantage of both offline and online spaces and often moves from web-to-street, vice versa, and from web-to-street-back-to-web; that is, women's protests in Britain that work in tandem: anti Page 3 Girl campaigns happen online (e.g., @NoMorePage3) and offline (outside the Sun headquarters in London). But, more importantly, the trafficking of feminism between the online and the offline, as evidenced by these cases, strongly suggests that separating the online from the offline is neither possible nor desirable. Thus, contributing to the ideological difference of fourth wave feminism, when compared to its predecessors, is its topological and topographical positions: it reaches and connects mass audiences in rapid speed and, in doing so, it collapses the binary between the online and the offline to the extent that the online and offline are not, and perhaps never were, separate spheres.
In its most recent stage (2014-present), social media like Twitter continues to be fundamental to the fourth wave's distinct identity and visibility as necessary public platforms for commentary and mobilizing (i.e., a feminist call out culture against the kyriarchy [Baumgardner 2011; Munro 2013; Risam 2015; Vogel 2014]) and as objects of study (i.e., online harassment and representation). A delineation between the offline and the online is implicitly, if not explicitly, rejected and the employment of intersectional feminism is the dominant framework (Munro 2013, 25).

Without digressing too much, however, the movement is also detectable in the following areas: 1) an extenuation of third wave goals such as “reproductive justice, trans inclusion, sexual-minority rights…the deconstruction of privilege,” and a more complex consideration of race (Vogel 2014, n.p. paraphrasing Baumgardner 2011; Perry 2014, 39); 2) a renewed interest in global politics and inequity such as women’s poverty, education, (un/under)employment, sexual rights, and health. Consider that “international institutions, such as the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, the World Economic Forum (WEF), the World Health Organisation (WHO), have placed gender equality as a top priority on their policy and action agendas” (Phillips and Cree 2014, 940); 3) a repoliticization of second wave politics, which the third wave often rejected (Cochrane 2013; Knappe and Lang 2014, 364; Phillips and Cree 2014, 939), including human trafficking, socialism, anticapitalism, patriarchy, pornography, rape and rape culture, slut-shaming, body shaming, and sex positivity (Smith 2014); and 4) a continued indulgence in “a highly commodified feminine identity [which] is ideologically inconsistent” (Phillips and Cree 2014, 941).

To reiterate, analyzing how intersectionality and social media are jointly taken up by fourth wave feminists in contesting racism and sexism is my main concern in this article, demonstrated by the third section’s focus on the Twitter hashtag #solidarityisforwhitewomen. Moreover, studying the hashtag directly participates in advancing and developing fourth wave feminism as a distinct movement. Before I move on to this discussion, however, I establish what is meant by the term intersectionality and why, as a methodology, it is most applicable for fourth wave feminism.

“What Intersectionality Does Rather Than What Intersectionality Is”

Intersectionality emerged as a movement committed to feminism and anti-racism in the late 1980s. Grounded in the history of Black feminism, its applicability to legal doctrines and critical law studies became evident and it is often attributed to the legal work of Kimberlé Crenshaw (Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall 2013, 789-790). More than a theoretical framework or praxis of difference, intersectionality addresses the dynamics of inequalities (including identifying those that are less transparent); furthermore, it purposely avoids being a totalizing or “grand theory” (789) by refusing to conceive disadvantage and subordination “along a single categorical axis,” namely gender (Crenshaw 1989, 57). In 1989, Crenshaw published her now seminal article “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics.” Providing several legal case studies on Black women, Crenshaw articulates how “Black male and white female narratives of discrimination were understood to be fully inclusive and universal, [but] Black female narratives were rendered partial, unrecognizable, something apart from standard claims of race discrimination or gender discrimination” (Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall 2013, 790). The strong advice for antidiscrimination discourse is to center those who are marginalized by adopting an intersectional framework (Crenshaw 1989, 58-59).

In “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color,” Crenshaw (1991), continuing to build on her framework, examines systematic, social, and individual violence against women. She insists that, while a sense of shared experiences among women is necessary for political visibility and social change, in order to adequately consider the issue, one must take into account intragroup differences such as class and race. For this reason, leading transnational feminist Vrushali Patil (2013) characterizes intersectionality as having replaced patriarchy as the dominant mode for critiquing women’s inequality (849). But, as she points out, patriarchal ideology may in fact be the foundation and source for a plurality of inequalities beyond gender (i.e., colonialism and imperialism) and these hierarchal relations may feed back into and cultivate other patriarchal models (i.e., the family) (848).
Criticizing both feminism and antiracism for treating gender and race as mutually exclusive identities, however, Crenshaw (1991) writes: “Contemporary feminist and antiracist discourses have failed to consider intersectional identities such as women of color” (1242-1243). Failing to consider intersectionality further marginalizes the person or the group (for example, women of colour) as each single-axis identity marker seeks to trump the other identity marker. That is to say, if a woman of colour is subsumed under the category woman as her primary identity marker, racial differences between women (not to mention other differences like sexuality, national, cultural, religious, or class) are effaced and overlooked; if she is marked by her race, then her gender fails to be fully taken into consideration. Furthermore, as Devon W. Carbado (2013), elaborating on Crenshaw’s work, points out, “Black women [were not permitted] to represent a class of plaintiffs that included white women or Black men: here, courts were essentially saying that Black women were too different to represent either white women or Black men as a group” (813). Therefore, Crenshaw (1991) adopts an intersectional approach in her study: “I explor[e] the various ways in which race and gender intersect in shaping structural, political, and representation-al aspects of violence against women of color” (1244). Crenshaw is not advocating only for the inclusion of Black women or immigrant women in terms of being recognized by the legal system, but she is challenging, via an intersectional lens, the structures, ideologies, and systems, which insist upon and impose specific political identities yet cannot represent some subjects—so-called “impossible subjects” (Ngai 2004)—which do not neatly fit into rigid, predesignated categories of identity.

Revising her earlier work for a special edition of Signs in 2013, Crenshaw, along with Sumi Cho and Leslie McCall, published, “Toward a Field of Intersectionality Studies: Theory, Applications, and Praxis,” a seminal article outlining intersectionality’s genealogy and its place as a distinct field of study. Engaging with the promises and challenges of this discipline, the authors identify three aspects of the field: 1) application of intersectional theory; 2) discursive debates about the term as a theory and methodology; and 3) political interventions. For the purpose of this article on Twitter, I am mostly concerned with the first and last categories. I disagree with scholar Jennifer C. Nash (2008) who purports that “intersectionality has yet to contend with whether its theory explains or describes the processes and mechanisms by which subjects mobilize (or choose not to mobilize) particular aspects of their identities in particular circumstances” (12). Twitter, for several years now, as the third section demonstrates, has been an effective means for enacting feminist social movements and exposing social inequality and subordination. Thus, as Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall (2013) insist, “efforts to produce new knowledge cannot dispense with the apparatuses through which information is produced, categorized, and interpreted (792). Understanding how Twitter, a means for knowledge dissemination and political intervention, has become a tool for fourth wave feminists committed to applying intersectionality as a strategy for identifying and contesting overlapping power dynamics and axes of inequalities is therefore key.

**Twitter: Race, Sex, and Intersectionality**

In a neoliberal post race/gender/intersectionality society committed to consumption, privatization, institutionalization, and commodification, how can the fourth wave create inroads, especially when prolific transnational feminist scholars like Chandra Talpade Mohanty (2013) believe that “theory—feminist and/or antiracist—is trafficked as a commodity disconnected from its activist moorings and social justice commitments” (972)? Feminist antiracist activism on Twitter, however, is an example of social transformation and suggests that feminist theorists should abandon separating the offline from the online. Keeping this false dichotomy intact silences marginalized voices and conceals the fact that Twitter feminism actively engages with intersectional theory, which repoliticizes marginalized groups and renews the power of critique among feminist and antiracist voices. Rejecting the division is imperative because, as Mohanty, in a footnote, writes: “The ‘old’ (and enduring) hierarchies of colonialism, racism, classism, and (hetero)sexism are alive and well… Global processes of domination and subordination are certainly complex in 2013, but the technologies of colonialism are still accompanied by violence and exclusions that are systemic” (968). A theoretical framework appropriate to the fourth wave’s experiences is necessary and intersectionality holds neoliberal post-ideology (e.g., post–race/feminism) as unsuitable. This is
most evident in Twitter activism by WoC against white privilege and white feminism (Milstein 2013), the latter of which have remained somewhat impervious and hostile to criticism and accountability.

Being born in and yoked to the capitalist, neoliberal global system, Twitter, a form of social media (O’Reilly and Milstein 2011) and the seventh most visited website in the world (Risam 2015), potentially offers those who are marginalized and disenfranchised a substantial space to voice dissent and social outrage and to politically organize against the above named restrictions. At the same time, the very public nature of social media like Twitter further plays a large role in insisting on intersectional feminist frameworks. The format offers users a brief profile, 140 characters of text, and the ability to share photos and images. Hashtags are personalized catchphrases, which can be easily searched and linked (for instance, #YesAllWomen21 is considered “trending” when it reaches large audiences). Media is shared by tweeting and retweeting to followers, but, as Roopika Risam (2015), an authority on Twitter, deftly points out, “interacting with other users does not require any formal linking of accounts” (n.p.). Thus connectivity amongst users is maximized and this explains why Twitter is invaluable in documenting events, such as protests, in real time.

Twitter, despite, or in spite of, brevity, is a protest tool in and of itself. Munro (2014) argues that the medium has, by and large, created a new language for fourth wavers: “Terms such as WoC, cis and TERF are invaluable given the 140-character limit imposed by Twitter, and lend themselves to the practice of hashtagging” (25). A controversial feminist journalist and writer, Meghan Murphy (2013) refers to this activity as Twitter feminism and elaborates that “[it’s] is all about hashtags and mantras. We all compete to make the most meaningful, (seemingly) hard-hitting statement in order to gain followers and accolades. Invent the right hashtag and you can become a feminist celebrity” (n.p.). Seemingly, the goal is to attract a large number of followers in order to quickly spread one’s message and spark conversations.

Though Twitter is an indispensable tool for intersectional feminist praxes, critics still falsely distinguish between the online and the offline. For example, Henrike Knappe and Sabine Lang (2014) write:

Active bloggers on the subject, Mariame Kaba and Andrea Smith (2014), however, question whether a delineation between online and offline spaces is productive, but fail to extend this thinking to its logical conclusion, which is that one cannot separate the two. Furthermore, a refusal to separate the online and the offline is imperative for understanding intersectional feminist engagements and activities.

Although counter-intuitive for a methodology committed to seemingly immutable categories of identity, like race, an intersectional feminist methodology nevertheless necessitates a rejection of conceiving identity in terms of binary thinking. Intersectional feminism, if it is to impart political change, must embrace and foster categories of identity according to a non-binary spectrum while, at the same time, remaining hostile to being subsumed and high-jacked by neoliberal thinking, which attempts to render discrimination invisible (e.g., individualism or analogizing that the post offline/online space is the same as claiming we are a post-race or a post gender society). Intersectional feminism reveals that neoliberalism, at the same time as espousing equality for all as in being post sexism, simultaneously enforces and naturalizes hierarchical binary categories such as gender (male/female) as a means of oppression. Therefore, it is incumbent on us to recognize Twitter feminism as a grassroots project or grounded praxis, like Cochrane’s (2013) example of the anti-Page 3 campaigns, and that the online and offline are one in the same.

Intersectional feminism on Twitter reveals that activism online is offline activism and offline activism is online activism. The innovative web-based project Everyday Sexism, which now has 219,000 followers, traverses this interstitial space. Founded by Laura Bates, the project “proved so successful that it was rolled out
to 17 countries on its first anniversary this year, tens of thousands of women worldwide writing about the street harassment, sexual harassment, workplace discrimination and body-shaming they encounter” (Cochrane 2013, n.p.). Bates’ project does important work in making harassment visible as a gendered issue, but it likewise addresses one of Patil’s (2013) criticisms of intersectionality: it does not adequately take into consideration cross-border dynamics or transterritorial inequalities (853). The site, transnational in scope, though admittedly quite British focused, allows women from different geo-political-situations, provided they have access to a computer, the internet, the tech tools, and a proficient command of the English language, to post their experiences and to advocate for change.

The rationale behind sites like Bates’ is that its “organizing is designed to enable participants to recognize, analyze, and address the overlapping layers of marginality and discrimination in their lives” (Chun, Lipsitz, and Shin 2013, 918). These layers are evident when reading posts on the site such as those directly experienced by the person and/or those indirectly experienced (i.e., a Kim Kardashian sex-tape flag flying at Glastonbury Festival). Both kinds of claims express a revived reiteration of the second wave’s insistence that the personal, because it is inherently political, must enter into public spaces and dialogues. In doing so, definitions of sexism are determined by preexisting notions of the term (enabling the initial recognition and vocalization), but thereafter expanded upon, and most likely challenged, by the plethora of posts by other tweeters. Twitter therefore provides an indispensable stage for critical discussions and debates relating to feminism, which cuts across intersectional lines like race and class.

The idea that all fourth wave feminist projects, however, are inherently intersectional is misleading. In “Hashtag Feminism, #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen, and the Other #FemFuture,” Susana Loza (2014), writing on how Twitter is a platform for expressing feminism, notes that many WoC are frustrated and angered by mainstream feminism privileging white feminism; that is to say that solidarity equals white women. For example, vocal activist Mikki Kendall (@Karynthia) called out white feminists, such as Vanessa Valenti, for defending white male feminist Hugo Schwyzer’s racial discriminations. Kendall devised the now infamous hashtag #solidarityisforwhitewomen, which was retweeted 75,465 times over four days (Loza 2014). Reflecting on her hashtag, Kendall (2013b) writes that digital feminism and, according to my theory she means feminism generally, is too exclusionary and does not meaningfully value WoC’s perspectives: “White feminism has argued that gender should trump race since its inception. That rhetoric not only erases the experiences of women of color, but also alienates many from a movement that claims to want equality for all” (n.p.). Race theorist Lauren Walker (2013), who once identified with the label “feminist,” responded to Kendall’s hashtag in “Why #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen Has Been So Meaningful To Me, And Why It Must Never Be Forgotten” and outlines the many ways in which feminism erases race to the extent that she concludes: “Solidarity was, and is, for white women” (n.p.). The debate surrounding Schwyzer, of course, is a mere snippet of the larger issues pertaining to feminist solidarity and digital feminist praxis, which continues to mis-and-under represent matrices of power like race and class.

Mainstream digital feminist praxes (e.g., the 2012 #Fem Future convention and the report #Fem Future: Online Revolution which followed, put together by Courtney Martin and Vanessa Valenti in conjunction with the Barnard Center for Research and Women and organized around making online feminism financially sustainable) can and do exclude WoC in part because they fail to employ an intersectional framework. Elitism and white middle-class feminism will continue to dominate digital studies and the feminist digital future until it is radically ruptured by marginalized voices who are no longer marginalized (Okolosie 2014, 92). Vivian M. May (2014) calls this “the struggle to articulate what cannot necessarily be told in conventional terms, and the struggle to be heard without being (mis)translated into normative logics that occlude the meanings at hand” (99). Thus, intersectional feminists, attune to such predicaments, must remain self-reflexive in working to transform categories that violently homogenize and hierarchize.

Race and gender theorist Naomi Zack (2005), however, argues that intersectional analyses keep white women in the dominant position (7-8) by reinforcing “the distinction between ‘feminism’ on the one hand and ‘multi-cultural feminism’ and ‘global feminism’ on the other (Garry 2011, 829). Unsurprising, this sentiment sometimes is presented for the opposite reason—
meaning intersectionality is the intellectual property of WoC; that is, Iphis (2014), whose blog title “If you’re white, don’t call yourself an ‘intersectional feminist’ and don’t use ‘intersectionality’ for white people” claims that calling oneself intersectional if he or she is not of colour is political misappropriation and serves to hegemonize white feminism. Philosopher Ann Garry (2011), like Zack (2005), conversely, argues that intersectionality does in fact apply to all women “given that all people, not just the oppressed, have race/ethnicity” (Garry 2011, 829), not to mention age, ableism, sexuality, class, etc. Unlike Zack (2005) and Iphis (2014), Garry (2011) does not conceive of intersectionality as a “conceptual basis for dividing feminists” (829). The intersectional feminist nevertheless “signals the end of a certain conception of feminism, a (neo)liberal conception that may have applied, at best, to that fraction of womankind who had the wealth, power, and leisure to conceptualize themselves as autonomous beings exercising their will through individual agency and choice (Hayles 1999, 286)” (Loza 2014, n.p.).

In her provocative essay “Feminism’s Toxic Twit-ters,” Michelle Goldberg (2014) queries whether the race wars between feminists or the “trashing” of other feminists in the name of intersectionality, such as that which resulted from the #Fem Future report, benefits or hinders feminism. Goldberg suggests that infighting within feminism (made public on Twitter) has disrupted a “former feminist blogosphere [which] seemed an insouciant, freewheeling place, revivifying women’s liberation for a new generation” (13). Feminist debates have resulted in fearmongering in terms of speaking up against ideas, risking alienation from a group that purportedly is a safe community, and jeopardizing one’s reputation. Furthermore, such behaviour weakens the movement and inclines feminists and potential allies to disengage. Intersectionality may be “the dogma that’s being enforced in online feminist spaces …Online, however, intersectionality is overwhelmingly about chastisement and rooting out individual sin” (15). Thus, Goldberg sees intersectionality as having a toxic effect in online feminist spaces.

Similarly, in “The Trouble with Twitter Feminism,” Murphy (2013) offers a frank, non-exhaustive list of the abuse she has received over Twitter such as that she is a “white supremacist,” that she “hates women,” and that she is a defender of Schwyzner (n.p.). Murphy, however, only discusses the experiences of a white, cis-gendered woman and she is a polarizing figure in Canadian feminist social media and minority communities; for example, sex workers and trans* folks and their allies have tried to ban her columns from leftist publications such as Rabble.ca. Her antagonistic position, however, helps frame the debate within and surrounding intersectionality, Twitter, and fourth wave feminism. For example, Murphy writes: “I don’t think it’s [Twitter is] a place for productive discourse or movement-building. I think it’s a place where intellectual laziness is encouraged, oversimplification is mandatory, posturing is de riguer, and bullying is rewarded” (n.p.). Murphy concludes that Twitter “1) is not at all representative of the feminist movement and the actual beliefs of and work done by feminists around the world and 2) It is a generally, toxic and unproductive place for feminism and movement-building” (n.p.). Moreover, Murphy questions the ability of online feminism to compensate for face-to-face feminism and “on the ground” praxis, but as I have suggested throughout this article, the failure to confront this false binary of offline and online is also a failure to seriously engage with intersectionality and to confront oppression like racism.

The ability for online posters to remain anonymous and utter derogatory remarks without severe repercussions (i.e., trolls, doxers, misogynists, racists) because Twitter does not have a code of behavior, however, is a legitimate concern that Murphy voices in her anti-Twitter grievances.24 Another controversial figure, Daniel Greenfield (2014), Shillman Journalism Fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center, further adds that online feminism, read intersectional feminism, egregiously berates and shames white privilege, which has led to a dizzying effect of prostrated white feminists apologizing while “the other side [WOC] keeps punching them” (n.p.). Greenfield purports that white feminists often disingenuously supplicate themselves for fear of being reprimanded as anti-intersectional and racist.

Countering representations of the Twittersphere as toxic (Goldberg 2014; Greenfield 2014; Murphy 2013), Kaba and Smith (2014) argue that “The only way we can avoid toxicity is to actually end white supremacy, settler colonialism, capitalism and patriarchy. Women of color know that when we leave the supposed ‘toxicity’ of Twitter, we are not going to another place
that is not toxic. Thus, our goal is not to avoid toxicity, as if that is even possible, but to dismantle the structures that create toxicity” (n.p.). Removing one’s self from Twitter in order to avoid denigrating comments signals privilege because deep-rooted inequalities, particularly for WoC, are experienced online and offline. Contrary to assumptions that a digital self has no physicality, a body behind anonymity is still expected in online relationships. Discriminations based on visibility (of race, class, disability, age, and gender) continue to perniciously persist (Kendall 2002, 215). Digital worlds like Twitter, however, certainly complicate notions of identity and representation.

Subverting Goldberg’s (2014) rhetoric that intersectional feminism on Twitter is destructive, Risam (2015) claims that mainstream white feminists’ utopic visions of an idyllic online setting are in fact toxic discourses:

These toxic discourses, disseminated online, help replicate and amplify racialized and gendered differences that exist among progressive activists. In doing so, they position women of color as the repository of failure for online feminism, guilty of creating spaces in which white feminists claim a reluctance to speak, for fear of censure. As a result, engagement with intersectional, rather than single-issue, feminism is rendered a problem, a disruption, perhaps even a distraction from the putatively more productive work of an online feminism untroubled by ‘infighting’ over racial dynamics. (n.p.)

She further contends that “the most troubling facet… is that she [Goldberg] holds women of color largely to blame for the backlash against Martin and Valenti [#Fem Future]. In doing so, she instantiates a notion of toxic femininity, positioning women of color feminists as the disruptive bodies that transgress fictive, ideal feminist spaces on Twitter” (n.p.). The label of toxic as an antonym of health, wellness, and/or harmless indicates two important things: 1) WoC’s voices pose a considerable threat to mainstream feminism (emphasizing the former’s influence and power); 2) the neo-conservative reaction is to label those who oppose the normalization of discrimination as “toxic,” thereby silencing marginalized voices and stabilizing “a hegemonic version of online feminism” (Risam 2015, n.p.). Like Risam, Kaba and Smith (2014) contest “the trope of the ‘bad feminist,’” which Kendall as well as other WoC feminists have been labeled:

[It] has been deployed as a disciplinary mechanism for re-establishing and maintaining power and control. Rather than substantively engage Black feminist critiques, for example, gatekeepers demonize the bad Black feminist who is not nice to white women. The analysis of ‘twitter’ wars then quickly devolves into a battle among individual personalities. [Feminism actually needs less focus on individuals and more on the collective struggle to uproot oppression]. (n.p.)

Mainstream feminism’s refusal to seriously consider voices from the margins means the movement continues to be exclusionary, segregating, and non-intersectional.

Jamie Nesbitt Golden, like Kendall, therefore believes in the mobilizing potential of technology, especially Twitter and hashtag feminism, to bring WoC, across borders and boundaries, together so as to create an important movement and space for political resistance: “Social media has made it possible for black feminists in Johannesburg to connect with black feminists in St. Louis and all points in between. Blogs written by women of color from one side of the globe become topics of discussion on the other side in a matter of minutes” (Golden as qtd. in Loza 2014, n.p.). Golden emphasizes that a transnational feminist approach to online relationships carves out a unique space for Black feminists who may have no face-to-face contact. The space also brings visibility and awareness to “people and projects generally overlooked by popular feminist outlets” (as qtd. in Loza 2014, n.p.). That WoC’s organizations radically disrupt and transform feminist politics via Twitter is unequivocal (Okolosie 2014, 90).

In reference to the exchange on Schwyzer, Kendall (2013b) adds that “despite the natural brevity encouraged by Twitter, any conversation that can span a full day must generate some change. The only question is whether or not feminism will be receptive to the critiquing and to doing the work required to resolve the problems” (n.p.). Kendall’s statement in fact highlights two problematic, systemic issues in regards to feminism: is it not highly suspicious that just as WoC’s voices are seriously decentering white privilege, are demanding recognition, and are bringing race and feminism to the
forefront of debate, that digital feminism, and Twitter in particular, is claimed to be in crisis, internecine, divisive, merely cathartic? In addition, intersectional frameworks are being charged with reifying categories of identity, oppression, and privilege (Garry 2011, 830) and therefore failing as analytic tools and means to establish gender and social justice.

Worse yet, as Crenshaw’s (1991) intersectional critique of antiracist and feminist approaches highlighted, the logic that places gender once again as the single defining characteristic of one’s self is being applied to global concerns. For example, Flavia Dzodan (2011) writes about a sign, held by a white woman at a New York Slut Walk, which read: “woman is the N* of the world.”26 Responding to critics like Shira Tenant, who implicitly defended the sign in the name of feminist solidarity, Dzodan posted: “MY FEMINISM WILL BE INTERSECTIONAL OR IT WILL BE BULLSHIT! Do you see where I am coming from with this? Am I not supposed to apply that lens to Slut Walk? Am I supposed to ignore the violence that ensued in the N* word discussion? Am I supposed to overlook its blatant violence in the name of sisterhood?! IS THAT WHAT IS EXPECTED OF ME?!” (n.p.). Dzodan’s comments highlight how non-intersectional feminism polices criticism and forces would-be WoC allies to distance themselves from the movement. By upholding global justice and/or global solidarity as the higher feminist goal, unified by gender—this is the case with the hashtag #Bringbackourgirls27 (italics mine)—those voices, which are so crucial to feminism, instantaneously become obsolete and irrelevant. In decrying the power of Twitter feminism (and thereby the power of WoC’s voices using said technology) to impact social change and in moving the goal posts, marginalized voices are doubly silenced.

If the fourth wave is to move forward in its commitment to solidarity, it must gain stability and credibility from WoC. Unsurprisingly, however, feminists have taken issue with the way the argument surrounding white solidarity and white feminism versus women of colour feminism has been framed. Veronica Arreola (2014) of Viva La Feminista in “The Colour of Toxicity” recaps the debate between Kendall and Goldberg on the inclusivity and exclusivity of #Fem Future; she points out “[t]he erasure of a larger critique by Latinas, Asian women, Native women of #Femfuture... Our issues may not be the same and not every woman of color was critical of these conversations, but it was far more diverse than just black feminist twitter” (n.p.). Like Kaba and Smith (2014), Daniela Ramirez (2013), writing from a Latina perspective, contests “the myth of representation” the term WoC implies. She argues that WoC is “the very category that has been used to justify our exclusion from—and tokenist representation within—the mainstream movement” (n.p.). Importantly, she clarifies that there is no monolithic or singular notion of WoC and that many women are not either a white woman or a woman of colour, but “both.”

Being both, la mestiza (Lugones 2003; Moraga 1983; Anzaldúa 1987), creates its own set of problems in terms of choosing between solidarity with WoC and being “white feminist” allies, given that Latinas like Ramirez (2013) “are not recognized fully as members of either [group]” (n.p.). This notion invites one to question whether racial identity, like gender (or as Judith Butler [1990] suggests sex), is a construct that can be experienced on a spectrum and as fluid? Consider the now infamous case of American civil rights activist Rachel Dolezal, who culturally identifies as Black, but is not African American. Unsurprisingly, Dolezal has polarized views on this subject: she has found some support from groups and individuals who either accept or identify with her identity struggles. For example, an interview with race scholar Alyson Hobbes by television host and political commentator Melissa Harris-Perry (2015) on The Melissa Harris-Perry Show on MSNBC discusses the possibility of cis and trans racial identity (using the parlance of transgenderism).28 Others, like Kat Blaque (2015), a Black trans vlogger for Everyday Feminism, however, has made convincing arguments about crucial differences between gender identity and racial identity, not least of which is the legacy of slavery.

Crenshaw’s (1991) emphasis on how WoC are rendered non-representable when either gender or race is the determining axes of inequality adds complexity to the issue. Lola Okolosie (2014), speaking on the reception and dissemination of intersectionality and an erroneous perception in the United Kingdom that it is synonymous with Black feminism, clarifies:

As black feminism is presented as the site that ‘houses’ intersectionality, however inadvertently, we too are liable to ignore other intersections of oppression. Gender and
race become the principal foci from which much of our discussions about the term and concept are had. Ability, sexuality, age, nationality and class (which is often treated as implicated in our experience as members of ethnic minority communities) become areas that exist within our ‘safe spaces’ as marginal. (93)

Such thinking therefore calls on WoC feminists, and all feminists, to analyze oppressive, privileged structures, diversity, and heterogeneity within its own movement. McCall (2005) calls this intracategorical complexity because intersectionality pays more attention to race than class (1773, 1788); this might explain why Ramirez (2013) goes further to boldly suggest that other inequalities, such as socioeconomic status “and the privilege that it allows, unites and divides us more than race and gender” (n.p.). One may disagree that socioeconomic status is more important, but the point that McCall’s (2005), Okolosie’s (2014), and Ramirez’s (2013) analyses make is that intersectional feminists will often be faced with several competing axes of power and inequality and one may in fact be privileged in one way (e.g., class), but be disadvantaged in another (e.g., gender); thus, remaining self-reflexive, vigilantly attune to differences, and open to adopting new strategic practices of intersectionality is necessary.

Advancing this dialogue, following the Twitterstorm Kendall’s hashtag caused, both she and tech-media expert Sarah Milstein (2013) have devised steps white feminists can take towards a more progressive, intersectional perspective. Kendall (2013a) provides the following list: 1) Listen and do not become defensive: “Understand that your role is not to lead, or speak for women of color. We’re more than capable of speaking up for ourselves”; 2) Educate yourself and read; 3) Check yourself and others for racist, anti-feminist, and derogatory comments/actions; and 4) Understand that feminist communities will not all have the same goals or needs. Milstein (2013), like Kendall, stresses that raising feminist consciousness can be achieved when WoC and white feminists become allies: “Their insights are leading us toward a more conscious feminism. White women, however, need to take responsibility for educating [themselves]...White feminists [must] connect more genuinely with women of color [in order to] improve feminist outcomes for people of all races” (n.p.). Somewhat ventriloquizing Kendall, she emphasizes promoting intersectionality and inaugurating meaningful dialogue and change via: 1) Accept the intentional fallacy (basically, intentions—good or not—are irrelevant; only actions and impact matter); 2) Avoid being defensive; 3) Identify and rectify racist tendencies; 4) Listen to marginalized voices; and 5) Challenge the mis-and-under representation of minorities.

Kendall (2013a) and Milstein (2013) do important work in suggesting how one can adopt an intersectional approach to one’s anti-racist feminism, but there is also the need for systemic, institutional approaches to applying intersectionality like an honest commitment to diversity in terms of contributors, editors, executives, and any other gatekeepers as well as access to platforms, formal mentorships, and financial compensation for WoC, a point which is also argued by feminist writer and academic Roxane Gay (2013). Contributions from fourth wave feminists like Kendall (2013a, 2013b), Milstein (2013), and Gay (2013) continue to centralize WoC, a point which is also argued by feminist writer and academic Roxane Gay (2013). Contributions from fourth wave feminists like Kendall (2013a, 2013b), Milstein (2013), and Gay (2013) continue to centralize intersectionality (as a subject and a method) because its complexity, as witnessed on Twitter, lends itself well to the topics that concern fourth wave feminists the most: representation, racism, feminism, and solidarity.

Conclusion

To conclude, as many of the authors have suggested, the fourth wave is defined by its use of technology, so much so that it depends specifically on social media like Twitter for its existence. Twitter is the most important platform for fourth wave feminist activism chiefly because of its deployment of intersectionality. Identifying privilege, difference, representation, and racism from an intersectional approach is a necessary prerequisite for fourth wavers, demonstrated time after time with hashtags like #solidarityisforwhitewomen, which resonated, angered, and divided many feminists. As this article has argued, the work of feminism is to foster debate, to encourage critical discussion, to mobilize activism for social justice and change, and for feminists not to give into the fabricated binary between offline and online realms, which only reinforces oppression and division. Thus, intersectionality as a theoretical framework is most suitable for the fourth wave movement because it strives for political intervention and visibility, but not at the expense of silence, erasure, segregation, and/or marginalization. The intersectional framework employed by fourth wave feminists on the
issues of racism, feminism, and online representation, via Twitter, is therefore creating meaningful collaboration, fruitful coalitions, focused political action, and a firmer sense of what non-totalizing solidarity can and should look like.

Endnotes

1 These academics, journalists, and writers are the most influential in terms of Twitter debates on intersectionality and its toxicity. For instance, Mikki Kendall’s creation of the Twitter hashtag #solidarityisforwomen has inspired several articles including her own work, “After #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen: So You Want To Be An Ally, Now What?” (2013a) in XOJANE.

2 Mariane Kaba and Andrea Smith (2014) argue that “[u]sually, women of color appear in significant numbers in the third wave seemingly out of nowhere to join the struggle...[Thus] the incomplete and selective telling of a feminist history has been contested by many women of color over the years. Yet the idea that women of color (particularly Black women) are interlopers and disruptive presences within the feminist movement has persisted” (n.p.). See also the Combahee River Collective (1982).

3 For a more recent feminist critique of patriarchy, see Vrushali Patil (2013).

4 Maureen McNeil (2007) argues that, by the 1990s, there were two separate feminist camps in technoscience: “successor science” associated with Sandra Harding and cyberfeminism strategized by Donna Haraway (143). Haraway’s (1986) cyborg is “a cybernetic organism, a hybrid machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction” (291).

5 Postfeminism emerged in the early 1980s and is read by critics as a backlash against feminism (Faludi 1992, 15; Walters 1995, 117), an “othering” of feminism (Tasker and Negra 2007, 4), or a moving beyond feminism (McRobbie 2009, 28). Amber E. Kinser (2004) in “Negotiating Spaces for/through Third-Wave Feminism,” elaborates that “a now sophisticated and prolific postfeminist ideology...has co-opted and depoliticized the central tenets of feminism. The only thing postfeminism has to do with authentic feminism, however, is to contradict it at every turn while disguising this agenda, to perpetuate the falsehood that the need for feminist change is outdated” (124). Postfeminism is often characterized by individuality, choice, empowerment, sexuality, and consumption; therefore, it is problematic and flawed because equality between the sexes has not been achieved and feminism is necessary. That Hillary Clinton ran as the Democratic presidential candidate in 2016 would make for a fruitful comparison, but it would detract too much from my focus.

6 Judy Rebick (2013) stresses the necessity for peace to be a part of the fourth wave and, in doing so, strengthens this link between it and the second wave. Like E. Ann Kaplan (2003) who emphasized the centrality of peace in the face of terrorism, Rebick (2013) insists that, because “second-wave feminism began as a peace movement in Canada with the formation of the formidable Voice of Women (VOW), so peace must retain a central element of feminism” (683). In a sense, Shaaf’s work does still fit the bill of later fourth wave feminism because it was her website that reached a wide feminist audience.

7 This does not suggest that the third wave did not have an activist presence. Calls for LGBT legal rights and Pride parades for LGBT communities (although originating in the late 1960s and 1970s) gained widespread attention during the 1980s and 1990s and were at the forefront of this wave. However, as scholars like Judith Rebick and Jacquetta Newman and Linda White suggest, the third wave, as a whole, dwelled in the cultural arena and was less committed to a street presence, a defining feature of both the second and first waves of Anglo feminisms (Rebick 2013; 678; Newman and White 2013, 667).

8 The first Slut Walk took place in Toronto in 2011 after a police officer told women that they if they did not want to be victims/survivors of sexual assault, then they should not dress like sluts. The Walk is now held in several cities across the globe.

9 The Page 3 Girl is a daily featuring of a topless young woman: there is no male equivalent in the newspaper.

10 A collapse of the offline and online fits with Haraway’s (1986) cyborg, particularly because she critiques categorizations, such as race and gender and class, which are false, “contradictory, partial, and strategic” (295): “these consciousness[es]” have been “forced on us by the terrible historical experience of the contradictory social realities of patriarchy, colonialism and capitalism” (296).

11 Both intersectional feminism and posthumanism deconstruct the racist, sexist, homophobic discourses of (neo)liberal humanism. While these are preliminary remarks on the relation between intersectional feminism and posthumanism, more work is needed.

12 See Lydia Smith’s (2014) article for the appeal of Betty Dodson’s work on female masturbation.


14 Patil (2013) believes that Crenshaw and others are concerned with patriarchy in that intersectionality “articulates the interaction of racism and patriarchy” (Crenshaw as qtd. in Patil 2013, 852), but that it is not rigorously analyzed or developed (852).

15 Chandra Talpade Mohanty (2013) notes in response to critics that neither she nor Crenshaw are attempting to “reduce[e] the institutional analysis of state power and women-of-color epistemology to essentialist and reductive formulations” (969). She has also conceptually decolonized the notion of a singular or monolithic “Third World Woman.”
Bring back our girls refers to April 14, 2014 when 276 school girls were kidnapped from Government Secondary School, Chibok by Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria. Fifty seven escaped and 219 are still missing. The global outrage this event caused speaks once more that the second wave is being re-hashed in the fourth wave.

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