anything of significance relevant to human behavior. Despite the CBC's own recent inquiry into the status of women almost a decade ago, the Task Force found a number of areas that remained highly problematic. To their credit they were able to examine a list of 49 recommendations made to counter these problems, and to evaluate the CBC's progress in acting upon them. On the surface, it would appear that to have 23 of 49 recommendations evaluated as "implemented" is one way to fill the pages of a report and to announce a positive optimism as a result of the Task Force's own work. However, this was only done by avoiding drawing attention to the fact that of the 5 specifically related to issues of salary and equal pay for equal work, 4 remain "in discussion," (#25, 26, 28, 29, p. 131). Moreover, two recommendations which seem essential to the translation of the claimed policy of concern, are not only not yet implemented, but designated as "not to be implemented" (#44 and 46). Of the four still in discussion, #29, having to do with an examination of pay for contract workers, has special applicability to women, who we know from intensive studies are more likely to be involved in forms of work other than full time staff positions. To present the data in such a form to encourage the interpretation that 23 out of 49 recommendations is not a bad track record without a comment on the unequal significance of each of the recommendations, is at best, misleading.

Clearly, the report is much less about sex-role stereotyping in the broadcast industry than it is about the attempt to make a narrow, fragmented version of an interesting and important question an official ideology that legitimizes conformity and social control just in time to make the fiction of Nineteen Eighty Four a reality.

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It has become commonplace in feminist circles to assert that most of the work in the social sciences claiming to illuminate human experience has actually grown out of a male perspective and examined only the male experience. In psychology, we routinely cite for our students the concept of penis envy and the failure to include females in the research on achievement motivation as blatant examples of this problem. Carol Gilligan's book is a potent reminder that blindness to the female perspective in the theories that shape our research on human behavior and development cannot be relegated to a list of quaint examples from the past. In her searching examination of the question of gender-related differences in moral development, however, Gilligan leads the reader beyond the tired sense of déjà vu that accompanies the discovery that, once again, our discipline has been seduced into an acceptance of the male life story as the norm for the human experience. This is because the book does more than simply point out the problem: it describes Gilligan's own research, and theoretical perspective in which she attempts to uncover a female pattern of moral development.

Gilligan argues that the theories of developmental psychology that equate maturity with increasing separation and autonomy often leave females looking inferior or incomplete because of a "failure" to achieve separation or independence. She suggests that, had the female rather than the male pattern of development been accepted as the norm, there would be more emphasis on the development of responsibility and care for others as evidence of maturity, and less on separation. In terms of moral development in particular, she hypothesizes that, while men in our culture may follow the sequence of stages identified by Kolhberg in which they
become increasingly conscious of and able to articulate individual rights and the abstract principles governing them, women achieve moral maturity by following a different path and articulate it “in a different voice.” In essence, she says, men develop an “ethic of rights” while women develop an “ethic of responsibility.” While the first emphasizes separation, the second emphasizes connection; while the first considers the individual as primary, the second places primacy on the relationship. In a theoretical arena where the focus is on individuation and individual achievement, such a concern with relationships makes women appear weak, but Gilligan aligns herself with Jean Baker Miller in arguing that concern for relationships is a valuable human strength.

To provide an empirical base for her theory-building, Gilligan refers frequently to three of her own studies, in which subjects were interviewed extensively about their definition of moral problems, what experiences they saw as moral conflicts and their conceptions of self. In the college student study, a small number of students were interviewed once as seniors in college and again five years after graduation. In the abortion decision study, 29 women were interviewed during the first trimester of a pregnancy when they were considering abortion, and most of them were interviewed again a year after the decision. In a third study, apparently still in progress, a sample of males and females matched on various demographic characteristics and chosen to represent a wide range of points in the life cycle, were interviewed. In reporting on these studies, the author cites no quantitative data, but instead quotes extensively from the responses of her subjects to illustrate both the different approaches taken by males and females at various ages and the development of moral reasoning in her female subjects. While this is the kind of approach that makes statistically-oriented psychologists squirm because it admits such a large opportunity for researcher bias, it serves very well the author’s stated purpose of building a theory which can later be rigorously tested.

The three-step sequence of stages Gilligan proposes to describe moral development for the women she studied involves first a movement from an initial selfishness to a concept of responsibility in which the good is equated with caring for others. This second stage gives way to a third perspective in which the concept of care and responsibilities is extended to include the self as well as others. The central issue, the interconnectedness of self and others, is understood differently at each stage, and progression through the stages is characterized by a progressively more adequate understanding of human relationships.

The transition from the second to the third stage, as described by Gilligan, is of particular interest. It involves women’s struggle with and eventual rejection of the stereotype of feminine goodness: complete unselfishness and dedication to the care of others at the expense of the self, in favour of an idea of goodness that includes care for the self. This stereotype of the good woman as someone who always subordinates her own needs to those of others has had such a profound effect on women in our culture, that even readers who quarrel with Gilligan’s theory and research methods will find her discussion of this transition fascinating and thought-provoking. She goes to the very heart of the issues of independence and relatedness that have been treated in less penetrating, more simplistic ways in popular works such as Colette Dowling’s The Cinderella Complex and Nancy Friday’s My Mother, Myself.

The discussion of the responses in the abortion decision study is interesting in its own right to anyone concerned with the issue of reproductive choice. A reading of the words of women confronted with this decision should banish the notion that any simple prescriptive answers can be adequate in this area. Many of these women
were facing for the first time a moral dilemma in which there was available no completely right choice - no choice that would not result in harm to someone. Some of their comments reveal a tremendous struggle with understanding and making the best possible decision. By contrast, the polarized political arguments about abortion necessarily seem shallow and inadequate.

I hope that this book will be read widely by scholars in the social sciences. Not only does it help to put our cultural biases into perspective, but it is a potentially vast source of ideas for research. In fact, I wish that Gilligan had placed more emphasis on outlining her views on the implications of her theory for future research on human development. She argues in her final chapter that a priority on the agenda for research is to "delineate in women's own terms the experience of their adult life" (p. 193). How this is to be done, however, she leaves to the reader. It is a challenge that feminist scholars will no doubt be quick to accept.

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I have been asked to write reviews of these two books, not a review. I shall examine them separately below, but it is worthwhile first to look at them together. On the surface, they are very similar—Canadian Feminism Today and Feminism in Canada. They are both collections of articles by women dealing with feminist concerns. Under the surface, they are completely different. If looking at them together does nothing else, it should clearly remind us not only of the ideological, theoretical, political and philosophical divisions within Canadian feminism today, but also of the diversity among feminist writings in levels of abstraction, focus of interest and basic assumptions about feminism.

Still Ain't Satisfied (SAS) has twice as many articles in about the same number of pages as Feminism in Canada (FinC). The articles in SAS are quite specifically focused on practical issues such as rape, reproductive rights, unionization, immigrant women, native women, lesbianism, politics, the arts, etc. FinC does not look at particular issues, but rather asks where women should be standing and where they should be moving, ideologically, theoretically and practically in the women's movement today. This book tries to show how "Integrative Feminism" (Angela Miles) can imbue research, science and female revolutionary political action as we move beyond "pressure to politics." Few of the authors in SAS are academics. Instead, they come from a variety of backgrounds and have a variety of experiences—both in work and in the women's movement. The authors in FinC are primarily academics, with many also being active in the women's movement. This does make the two books quite different in focus and in tone and I suspect in audience.

Before I discuss each of these books, I will comment on reviewing collections of readings. It is the hardest kind of book for a reviewer to do justice to. It is impossible to give adequate attention to each article. Some worthwhile articles may be neglected and thus be falsely seen by the reader as less important than others. Articles often differ not so much in quality as in scope and intention. But a cursory review may not make this clear to the potential reader. As a reviewer, I find myself asking: "If I did not have