Training in the Gendered Labour Market: New Realities, Requirements, and Rewards for Canadian Women

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Abstract
This study investigates the gender dimension of the dynamic relationship between training and other aspects of the reward structure of the labour market by using structural equation modelling to develop a causal model of women's training participation based on feminist theory. The model uses data from Statistics Canada’s new Workplace and Employee Survey (WES).

Introduction
The restructuring of Canada’s economy is marked by the shift from manufacturing to service, the re-organization of work, deregulation, and technological innovation. The current rhetoric suggests a positive link between these trends of the post-industrial economy and human resource development. For many Canadians, training has become crucial for establishing and maintaining employability in the new economy. Yet, a disparity between the "training-haves" and "training-have-nots" has been apparent for some years now and gender is one of the axes along which training is unevenly distributed.

The labour market and training policies, characteristic of the last few decades, have attempted to revitalize a weakened economy with an appropriately skilled workforce by facilitating women’s entry into non-traditional occupations. However, because female-dominated occupations continue to provide greater employment opportunities for women, and women tend to make training choices on the basis of what they perceive will give them an immediate, rather than long-term advantage, a gender imbalance in training programs persists (Gaskell 1992). Further, the gendered division of domestic labour acts as a barrier to women’s training participation. Even with the convenience provided by the new learning technologies, women do not have the same amount of time available to engage in training as men do (Lipsett 2000).

Training participation, the subject of this study, is a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon. An analysis of the relationships between the determinants of training and the role of training in the reward structure of the labour market requires a method that has the capacity to test cause-and-effect hypotheses simultaneously. Structural equation modeling is one of the few linear statistical methods with such a capacity. This study uses a feminist
More Than "Adding and Stirring": Explaining Women in the Labour Market

The two foundational labour market theories, human capital and segmentation theory, are unable to explain adequately the persistently sex-segregated nature of paid work. Human capital theory (Becker 1964) fails to account adequately for enduring inequalities in the rates of return to human capital investments between different groups; and while segmentation theory (Gordon, Edwards & Reich 1982) focuses on the structural barriers inherent in labour markets, it treats women as a homogeneous group. Both theories have been tested with the explicit purpose of analyzing gender differences (Quinlan 2004); and, while the theories were found to hold in general for both men and women, this work demonstrates that simply "adding and stirring" women into the foundational labour market theories does little to account for the gender structure of the labour market. A full appreciation of women's location in the labour market requires feminist theory.

As far back as Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1898), feminist theorists recognized the connection between women's reproductive labour and their ability to participate in paid work. More recently, Heidi Hartmann's (1979) work suggests the existence of a mutually reinforcing relationship between women's domestic responsibilities and their subordinate position in the labour market. Women find it more difficult to achieve extended job tenure, and the associated increases in earnings, because of their family responsibilities. Conversely, because women's labour market rewards are less than men's, they tend to be responsible for domestic work.

The dynamic relationship between women's paid and unpaid work is best understood within the context of the contradictions of contemporary capitalism. As Smith (1985) argues, with the growing use of technology in the production process, industrial capitalism becomes increasingly indifferent to social differentiations such as gender. Because engagement in the productive processes requires less physical strength than it once did, women can now compete with men for jobs. But, since women's labour market equality jeopardizes family life and in particular women's role in the family, new ways of gendering work are needed. Stratifying the paid labour force on the basis of sex (that is, gendered occupational segregation) is one way of reducing the competition and thereby ensuring women's traditional role within the family.

The post-war labour-capital accord, known as the Fordist contract, was built on the notion of a family wage (Rubery, Smith, & Fagan 1998). The inequality of men's and women's wages was justified on the basis that women did not support a family, whether or not this was indeed the case. Thus, the way most women received a living wage was to marry and share in the "family" wage in exchange for their domestic work. But, in recent times, the Fordist contract has all but collapsed. Full-time, full-year employment has rapidly been replaced by non-standard work: part-time, part-year or temporary employment, multiple job-holding, or own-account self-employment. The family wage has been virtually eliminated and more than half of the adult workforce lack employment stability and/or market income sufficiency (Shields and Burke 1999). The breakdown of the Fordist contract has provided significant economic motivation for women to enter the labour force. Not surprisingly, women are now participating in the Canadian labour market at unprecedented rates.

Some have argued that in the post-Fordist economy, the sexual division of domestic labour and its gendered relationship to paid employment breaks down. For instance, Siltanen (1994) suggests that the conventional distinction between bread-winning and child-rearing no longer holds up in the face of the massive increase in the number of employed women who have children. But, have things really changed for women, or is this merely wishful thinking on Siltanen's part?

Despite the recent labour market restructuring, which has provided new opportunities to women, some of these in the professional, managerial, and technical occupations, four fifths of Canadian women are concentrated in traditional occupations,
occupations that represent one quarter of all those available (Hughes 1998). The effect of occupational segregation on women's compensation is clear: when all other factors are controlled for, occupational segregation is one of the largest contributors to the wage gap between the sexes (England et al. 1994).

A comprehensive national system of affordable, quality child care remains as elusive as it did prior to the 1993 Liberal Red Book promise. In general, the trend is towards increasing privatization of a whole array of what once were state-supported care services, a trend that imposes immeasurable stress on women, particularly low-income, single-parent, working women. Statistics indicate that despite women's increased labour market participation, they continue to shoulder the majority of domestic and family responsibilities; consequently, many report that they are "severely time-stressed" (Statistics Canada 1999). Despite the pressures of their second shift, mothers, both employed and unemployed, have preserved, even increased the time they dedicate to their children (Gauthier, Smeeding, & Furstenberg 2004). It seems clear that the argument for changing the indicators of our nation's level of productivity to reflect time spent parenting is no less relevant now than when Marilyn Waring (1988) first raised it a couple decades ago.

Method

Testing social science theory often involves developing models of cause-and-effect relationships between constructs, which represent concepts that cannot be observed or measured directly: for example, discrimination, intelligence, and social class. Social scientists use structural equation modelling (SEM) to design and test such models.1 In comparison to many other linear statistical methods, SEM has a greater capacity to simultaneously test multiple and complex cause-and-effect relationships. Moreover, structural equation modeling has the capacity to distinguish between direct and indirect effects.

Cause-and-effect relationships embedded in a structural equation model are tested by evaluating how closely a particular sample of data matches the hypothesized model. If a model is found to be consistent with the data, we can say that the causal assumptions underpinning the model are not contradicted and may be valid. We only can say "may be valid" because other models, reflecting different causal assumptions, also may fit the data. Another limitation of what SEM can deliver arises from our understanding that in causal relationships the alleged cause precedes the effect. Thus, to test cause-and-effect relationships, longitudinal data are most desirable. Because this study does not use longitudinal data, the causal relationships implied by the study's model must remain tentative until such data are available.

Model-building starts with a hypothesized model, a set of causal relationships which are hypothesized from existing theory and empirical studies. Using one of the many modelling programs now available (this study uses EQS Structural Equation Modeling Software), the hypothesized model is tested, adjusted, and re-tested. Models are evaluated by examining: 1) the parameter estimates, numerical values associated with each path in the diagram, and 2) the fit indices, overall measures of how well the model matches the data (see Table 1). These evaluative tools are generated by the modelling programs.

Data Source

The Workplace and Employee Survey (WES), the study's data source, is the first and only employer-employee linked, national-level survey in Canada. This recently launched Statistics Canada survey samples workplaces and then employees within these workplaces from lists provided by employers. The first wave of the survey in 1999 captures data from 6,351 workplaces from 24,597 employees (13,977 men and 10,620 women), with a response rate of 83 percent (Statistics Canada 2001a). For the purposes of this study's model-building, a sample of 3,568 cases is generated by randomly selecting one third of the women-only WES cases (N = 10,620). The remaining two-thirds of cases are reserved for cross-validation of the model. Missing data are handled by Statistics Canada before the datafile is released.

Although the WES is extremely ambitious in scope, and all efforts were made to make the survey representative, there are exclusions to the sample. Only women in the formal, paid labour market are surveyed. Farm wives, domestic workers and any other self-employed women, and, of course, street-workers,
and other labourers of the underground economy, are not included.

The Model

The study’s model emphasizes the factors affecting women’s labour market participation that have been highlighted by feminist theory. Factors that are the focus of the foundational labour market theories are explicitly not included in this model (for example, age, level of education) in order that the feminist theory can be given centre stage. Models reflecting the foundational theories have been developed, comprehensively tested, and evaluated for their gender differences (Quinlan 2004).

The model below uses variables from Workplace and Employee Survey. The variables and their relationships to each other form a structural equation model. The hypothesized structural equation model is presented in conceptual form in Figure 1. The variable definitions are provided in Table A.1, Appendix A. From these variables, constructs, which are concepts that might not be observed or measured directly, have been developed using factor analysis. For example, benefits and hourly wages, together, indicate compensation, and the number of dependent children and marital status indicate family responsibilities.

In structural equation model diagrams, such as Figure 1, rectangles represent observed variables and ellipses represent constructs. Two-word variable or construct names are indicated by underscore hyphenation, and the names of constructs are italicized to distinguish them from variables. Arrows point from constructs to their indicator variables. Arrows in the diagram also point from predictors to outcomes: e.g., job_experience predicts training. The paths in Figure 1 are labelled to correspond to the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: Family_responsibilities have a negative effect on job_experience.
Hypothesis 2: Family_responsibilities have a negative effect on training.
Hypothesis 3: Family_responsibilities and labour_market_segregation have a reciprocal reinforcing (positive) relationship.
Hypothesis 4: Labour_market_segregation has a negative effect on training.
Hypothesis 5: Job_experience has a negative effect on training.
Hypothesis 6: Labour_market_segregation has a negative effect on compensation.
Hypothesis 7: Training has a positive effect on compensation.
Hypothesis 8: Job_experience has a positive effect on compensation.

Results

Guided by the hypotheses stated above, models were tested sequentially and systematically. The fit indices obtained in the final model (CFI = 0.95; RMSEA = 0.04) are well within the desired thresholds (Table 1). Further, the cross-validation performed on the model provides favourable evidence of replication and thereby offers a reasonable degree of confidence that the model generalizes to the larger population. Figure 2 provides the results of the final model in conceptual form with the parameter estimates associated with each cause-and-effect relationship. (See Appendix B for the results in EQS output form.) The dotted paths in Figure 2 indicate hypothesized paths that are found not to be significant. The deviations from the hypotheses, or otherwise interesting findings, are explored in the following paragraphs.

i) Family responsibilities have a positive, not negative effect on women’s job experience (Hypothesis 1); and

ii) Family responsibilities have a positive, not a negative effect on women’s training participation (Hypothesis 2).

These findings demonstrate that the more family responsibilities a woman has, the more training she participates in and the more job experience she accumulates. Although the effects are not large (0.21 for job experience and 0.07 for training), the very existence of a positive path suggest a change in the prevailing winds: even as recently as the mid-1990s, almost one-quarter (23%) of women reported that the presence of children was a barrier to their training participation (Gomez 1997).

iii) Contrary to Hypothesis 3, there is no reciprocal relationship between family responsibilities and gendered labour market segregation. This finding suggests that there is no direct relationship between women’s unpaid work and their segregation into certain occupations and industries in the paid labour
market. Assuming such a relationship was present a few decades ago, we can conclude from the model results that it is no longer there.

iv) There is no direct effect of labour market segregation on training, contrary to Hypothesis 4. However, there is an indirect, negative effect through job experience. Although it is small (-0.08), it is significant nonetheless.

v) The path from labour market segregation to job experience is not originally hypothesized, but found to be significant. The effect is positive, albeit small (+0.18). Noting that an increase in the labour_market_segregation construct represents an increase in the proportion of women in the employee’s occupation and industry, we can interpret the existence of the positive path in the following way: women’s job experience is dependent on the extent of the presence of other women in the occupation and industry. So, the more female-dominated the occupation, the longer women’s job tenure. The few women who are in the male-dominated occupations, either for the sake of the higher wages and status or simply because they enjoy the work, find the environment too difficult, too "chilly" to stay in the job for long.

vi) Of all the predictors of compensation, training has the strongest total effect (Table B.1, Appendix B). With a coefficient of +0.976, its effect on compensation is extremely strong. In fact, in comparison to all other direct effects, this is the largest of all those in the entire model (Figure 2). The strongest predictor of compensation is found to be training, even when all the effects, both direct and indirect, are considered. Second to training in its power to predict compensation is job experience, which has less than one-half the potency in comparison to training.

Discussion of Results

The model identifies that the more male-dominated the occupation is, the less time a woman stays in it. This has the effect of reinforcing the occupation’s gender composition. With this finding, the model verifies an essential assertion of the feminist theory: that is, women and men are assigned to fundamentally different types of occupations. While capitalism establishes the divisions between occupations, it is patriarchy that imposes a gender assignment to these divisions. Furthermore, by demonstrating that gender segregation negatively influences women’s compensation, the model lends credence to the aspect of feminist theory that speaks to the devaluation of women-specific work.

One of the most important findings of the study is that training is a crucial element in the reward structure of the labour market for women, as it plays a dual role of both a reward in itself and a predictor of other labour market rewards. Training is an investment, along with other elements of a total compensation package, devised to both attract high-skilled employees and reward them for their high productivity. The study’s model confirms that the training-to-compensation link is a positive one for women: the more training, the more compensation. This finding might be explained, at least in part, because the study’s training variable privileges employer-sponsored training (Table A.1, Appendix A). Employees tend to invest in general training because it is more portable and can realize a return with many potential employers, whereas employers tend to invest in specific training.

Another notable finding of the study is that family responsibilities are no longer dissuading women from engaging in training; in fact, family responsibilities prompt women to participate in training. Whether it is despite, or because of, family responsibilities, we can say that the presence of family responsibilities is no longer the barrier it once was. While the specific reasons for this are outside the model, we can speculate on the reasons for this. First, distance education has grown up over the past few decades. No longer limited to correspondence courses, students in adult education programs now have a buffet of modes to choose from: computer conferencing, long-distance telephone tutoring, and televised lectures. Second, the ethic of life-long learning has gathered steam over the past few years, with its hypnotic chant now drawing in both men and women. It seems that the presence of a first and a second shift are no longer significant deterrents to women’s engagement in training.

Could it be that women are engaging in training and gaining job experience, not in spite of, but because of, their family responsibilities? Conceivably, responsibilities for women, like men, are now an incentive, rather than a disincentive, to
engage in training and accumulate job experience. Given the increase in the number of single-parent families, which are predominately headed up by women, this is entirely plausible. It would seem that women are indeed no longer a reserve army, as theorized by Connelly (1978). Women are anxious to be full participants in the labour market and they want a return on their participation. Training increases that return.

Conclusions

According to all the statistical indicators used by the study, the model adheres to the data, and therefore offers confirmation of the underlying theory. Most of the deviations from the theory occur where direct effects were hypothesized; the results indicate that while these effects exist, they are indirect. For instance, labour market segregation has only an indirect effect on training participation. Other deviations, though, represent perplexing departures from aspects of the underlying theory. In particular, the model indicates that there is no relationship between family responsibilities and gendered labour market segregation.

The hypotheses of the model were based, in part, on previous empirical studies that largely have used multiple regression to model training and compensation, a technique that makes it difficult to distinguish between these two types of effects. By differentiating between direct and indirect effects, this study makes a contribution to the body of literature on the subject. The two most notable findings of the study are: 1) that for women training is the strongest determinant of compensation and, 2) that family responsibilities are not impairing women’s participation in job-related training.

Although the study demonstrates that training is the strongest determinant of women’s compensation, we need to be wary of presenting women’s participation in training as a ready-made solution to the gendered wage gap. Since engaging in training takes time, for women, particularly those with substantial family responsibilities, the requirement of more than a few hours, in addition to those required by their job, is likely to be a significant barrier to their participation in training. Even if increasing women’s training were a viable possibility, the solution puts the onus on individual women, rather than on collective solutions that can be achieved through social and labour market policies.

The study suggests that family responsibilities are no longer an impediment to women’s participation in training; however, we cannot assume that equity policies can be thrown on the scrap heap. Because women, on an individual level, have demonstrated their commitment to training does not suggest that governments may abdicate their responsibility of developing, promoting, and enforcing appropriate social and labour market policy. In fact, quite the converse: women’s demonstrated commitment to training is a good argument in favour of equity policies. The model suggests that women are willing to engage in training and they are deriving benefits from it. Comparing the strength of all the predictors of compensation, direct and indirect, we find that participation in training has the greatest impact on women’s wages and benefits. From this result, we can conclude that any efforts to make it easier for women to continue their participation in training will not be wasted.

With the additional supports provided by sound equity policies, in all likelihood more women would engage in more training. For women, especially those with family responsibilities, time is a barrier to participation in training. The issue of when training was undertaken is not included in this study. It is reasonable to suspect, however, that there is a ceiling on the number of hours, outside work, that women with family responsibilities are donating to training, and that the ceiling is lower than that for their male counterparts.

Further, we do not know the costs to women with family responsibilities engaging in training. Contrary to the predictions formulated in previous decades, women are not doing less unpaid work, despite the increase in the amount of their paid work. While women are avoiding work-family conflict by not having children, they cannot avoid having parents (Duxbury and Higgins 2002). Many of these parents are living longer and have debilitating, degenerative health problems, and there are still huge gaps within and between home-care and long-term nursing care. The increasing care-burden on sandwich-generation women makes it difficult for them to participate equally as trainees and productive employees, although the study’s findings indicate that
they are doing it nonetheless. The fact that women seem to be doing it all - engaging in training while carrying their family responsibilities - likely has huge implications for women’s health. Since long-term costs to women's health and the health of society, vis-à-vis child development, are outside of the model, this is an area to explore in future work. But we can speculate that the costs to women engaging in training are greater than those for their male counterparts, as women continue to shoulder most of the domestic responsibilities. Family-friendly workplace policies reduce these costs for women, and therefore, for society in general. However, it seems evident that we also need bold, sweeping, provocative initiatives that go well beyond the often-proposed family illness leave options, child-care programs, and flexible work schedules. We need to come to our policy-visioning-circles with fresh, new ideas for publicly funded and delivered, child-care and walk-to-grave, elder-care programs, such as cross-generational workplace care-centres that attend to the care needs of both aging seniors and infants, pre-schoolers, and latch-key kids, and, at the same time, reconsider old ideas such as collective kitchens, as proposed by Gilman (1898) over a century ago.

Endnotes
1. The fundamentals of structural equation modelling are discussed in Bollen, 1989; Byrne, 1994; Hoyle, 1995; Kline, 1998.
2. Cross-validation was done on three sub-samples. The first sample consists of only odd-numbered cases, N = 5,321; the second consists of only even-numbered cases, with N = 5299. And, finally the entire sample of 10,620 cases was used.

References


## Variables Used in Model

### Table A.1: Variables Required by Model, Hypotheses 1 - 8, listed alphabetically.

**Source:** 1999 Workplace and Employee Survey, employee and employer questionnaires, Statistics Canada, 2001c

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Variable Description</th>
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</table>
| benefits            | Used to measure the construct, compensation. Derived from employee survey questions #37 a - g(i)* coded into integer values: 0 - 9, where 9 is presence of all the below-listed benefits. * "The following questions cover the non-wage benefits related to this job. If any of these benefits are optional, please answer yes only if you participate in that benefit option. Does your employer have any non-wage benefits such as pension plan, life insurance or dental plan? Are you included in any of the following plans: an employer-sponsored pension plan? A group RRSP? a life insurance plan? a supplemental medical insurance plan? A dental plan? A stock purchase plan? Does your employer offer supplements to Employment Insurance benefits for maternity leave or layoffs? Does your employer contribute to the stock purchase plan?"
| dependent children  | Used to measure the construct, family_responsibilities. Derived from employee survey questions #53 and 53a *, is a weighted, cumulative variable calculated by multiplying type of child by number of children in each category, where type of child is a ranked variable, as follows: 0 = no children; 1 = school-age child; 2 = preschool-age child. See p. 52 of 1999 questionnaire for how to create dep_kids: integer values. Collapsed all values > or = 10 because of small cell size. * "Do you have dependent children? Please tell me their ages, starting with the youngest?"
| industry segregation| Used to measure the construct, labour_market_segregation. Derived by calculating the % of women in each industry; taken from post-coded variable (ie. there is no survey question) using the 6-digit NAICS classification. 1 = heavily male-dominated: 0 - 24.9% women; 2 = male-dominated: 25 - 39.9% women; 3 = mixed: 40 - 59.9% women; 4 = female-dominated: 60 - 74% women; 5 = heavily female-dominated: 75 - 100% women. Note: inspiration for the scale is taken from Geschwender (1999). |
| job tenure          | Used to measure the construct, job_experience. Derived from employee survey question #3 * by calculating a number of months working at this particular job, then coded into the following categories: 0 = 0 - 12 months; 1 = 13 - 24 months; 2 = 25 - 48 months; 3 = 49 - 84 months; 4 = 85 - 120 months; 5 = 121 - 180 months; 6 = more than 180 months. * "When did you start working at this particular job?"
| marital status      | Used to measure the construct, family_responsibilities. Derived from employee survey questions #51 and 52 *, is dichotomous: 0 = separated, divorced, widowed, or single and not living with a common-law partner; 1 = married or living with a common-law partner. * "What is your current marital status? Are you currently living with a common-law partner?"
### Occupation Segregation

| Occupation Segregation | **Used to measure the construct, labour_market_segregation.**
<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Derived by calculating the % of women in each occupation, taken from post-coded variable (ie. there is no survey question), which uses the 4-digit level (the most detailed level) of the 1991 Standard Occupation Classification.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1 = heavily male-dominated: 0 - 24.9% women;</td>
<td><strong>Note:</strong> inspiration for the scale is taken from Geschwender (1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 = male-dominated: 25 - 39.9% women;</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 = mixed: 40 - 59.9% women;</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 = female-dominated: 60 - 74% women;</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 = heavily female-dominated: 75 - 100% women.</td>
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### Training Received in the Past 12 Months

| Training Received in the Past 12 Months | **Used to measure the construct, training.**
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Derived from employee survey questions #25b(ii), #25c(ii), #25d(ii), #27b(ii), #27c(ii) *. The weighted cumulative variable is calculated by multiplying type of training by total # of hours, where type of training is a ranked variable as follows:</td>
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<tr>
<td>0 = no training;</td>
<td><strong>Note:</strong> inspiration for the scale is taken from Tuijnman’s (1989, 96) 3-category scale, with the following modifications:</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 = all non employer-sponsored training;</td>
<td>a) classroom training replaces Tuijnman’s credentialed training,</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 = employer-sponsored, job-related, non-classroom training (i.e. on-the-job training);</td>
<td>b) on-the-job training replaces Tuijnman’s non-credit training,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 = employer-sponsored, job-related classroom training.</td>
<td>c) inclusion of distinction based on employer-sponsorship is not included in Tuijnman’s scale.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Note: employer-sponsored training is defined in questionnaire as either &quot;employer-provided or employer-paid.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Variable is in terms of hours, then recoded into the following categories:</td>
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<tr>
<td>0 = 0 hours of training;</td>
<td><strong>Note:</strong> employer-sponsored training is defined in questionnaire as either &quot;employer-provided or employer-paid.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 = less than 0.5 hours of training;</td>
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<td>2 = 0.5 - 1 hours of training;</td>
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<td>3 = 1 - 2 hours of training;</td>
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<td>4 = 2 - 4 hours of training;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5 = 4 - 8 hours of training;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6 = 8 - 16 hours of training;</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 = 16 - 40 hours of training;</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 = 40 - 80 hours of training;</td>
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<td>9 = more than 80 hours of training.</td>
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</table>
| * "Thinking of the last classroom training course you completed in the past 12 months, how long was the course? And, continuing with the second most recent course, how long was the course? In the past 12 months, have you received any on-the-job training related to your job? How much in total was spent for on-the-job training? In the past 12 months, has your employer paid for or otherwise helped you to take courses outside your paid working hours that were not directly job-related, but with an objective of career development? Thinking of the last career-related training, not sponsored by your employer, that you completed in the past 12 months, how long was the course? And, continuing with the second most recent course, how long was the course?"

### Hourly Wages

| Hourly Wages | **Used to measure the construct, compensation.**
<table>
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<tr>
<td>Taken directly from the post-coded variable: post-coded using employee survey question #35 *, then transformed, as follows: hr_waget = 1 / hr_wage.</td>
<td><strong>Note:</strong> employer-sponsored training is defined in questionnaire as either &quot;employer-provided or employer-paid.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>* &quot;In your current job, what is your usual wage or salary before taxes and other deductions?&quot;</td>
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Appendix B:
Model Results.
Table B.1: Unstandardized Solution, Total and Indirect Effects, and Standardized Solution for Feminist Model - Run Against Women Only
Sample: N = 3,568.

CONSTRUCT EQUATIONS WITH STANDARD ERRORS AND TEST STATISTICS

**JOB EXPERIENCE = F3**
\( = 0.839*F1 + 0.244*F2 + 1.000 D3 \)
\( = 0.119 \quad 0.066 \)
\( = 7.077 \quad 3.716 \)

**TRAINING = F4**
\( = -0.551*F3 + 0.353*F1 + 1.000 D4 \)
\( = 0.139 \quad 0.121 \)
\( = -3.951 \quad 2.911 \)

**COMPENSATION = F5**
\( = 0.847*F3 + 0.795*F4 - 0.423*F2 + 1.000 D5 \)
\( = 0.174 \quad 0.102 \quad 0.095 \)
\( = 4.878 \quad 7.787 \quad -4.463 \)

Note: EXOGENOUS FACTORS: FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES = F1;
LABOUR MARKET SEGREGATION = F2.

DECOMPOSITION OF EFFECTS WITH NONSTANDARDIZED VALUES
PARAMETER TOTAL EFFECTS *

**JOB EXPERIENCE = F3**
\( = 0.244*F2 + 0.839*F1 + 0.244 D2 + 1.000 D3 \)
\( = 0.119 \quad 0.066 \)
\( = 3.716 \)

**TRAINING = F4**
\( = -0.134 F2 + -0.551 F3 + -0.109 F1 + -0.134 D2 \)
\( = -0.551 D3 + 1.000 D4 \)

**COMPENSATION = F5**
\( = -0.323 F2 + 0.410 F3 + 0.795 F4 + 0.625 F1 \)
\( = -0.323 D2 + 0.410 D3 + 0.795 D4 + 1.000 D5 \)

* Note: EQS 5.7b does not provide standard errors and z-statistics for total effects.

DECOMPOSITION OF EFFECTS WITH NONSTANDARDIZED VALUES
PARAMETER INDIRECT EFFECTS

**JOB EXPERIENCE = F3**
\( = 0.244 D2 \)
\( = 0.066 \)
\( = 3.717 \)

**TRAINING = F4**
\( = -0.134 F2 + -0.462 F1 + -0.134 D2 + -0.551 D3 \)
\( = 0.118 \quad 0.047 \quad 0.139 \)
\( = -2.835 \quad -3.919 \quad -2.835 \quad -3.953 \)

**COMPENSATION = F5**
\( = 0.100 F2 + -0.438 F3 + 0.625 F1 + -0.323 D2 + \)
\( = 0.040 \quad 0.085 \quad 0.109 \quad 0.072 \)
\( = 2.526 \quad -5.102 \quad 5.722 \quad -4.464 \)
\( = 0.410 D3 + 0.795 D4 \)
\( = 0.117 \quad 0.102 \)
\( = 3.509 \quad 7.785 \)

DECOMPOSITION OF EFFECTS WITH STANDARDIZED VALUES
PARAMETER TOTAL EFFECTS

www.msvu.ca/atlantis Atlantis 31.1, 2006
JOB EXPERIENCE = F3 = .214*F1 + .177*F2 + .961 D3

TRAINING = F4 = -.427*F3 + -.021*F1 + -.076 F2 + -.410 D3 + .908 D4

COMPENSATION = F5 = .390*F3 + .976*F4 + .152 F1 + -.224*F2 + .375 D3 + .887 D4

Note: EXOGENOUS FACTORS: FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES = F1; LABOUR MARKET SEGREGATION = F2.

DECOMPOSITION OF EFFECTS WITH STANDARDIZED VALUES
PARAMETER INDIRECT EFFECTS

TRAINING = F4 = -.091*F1 + -.076 F2 + -.410 D3

COMPENSATION = F5 = -.417*F3 + .152 F1 + .069*F2 + .375 D3 + .887 D4

STANDARDIZED SOLUTION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Formula</th>
<th>R-Squared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TENUREC</td>
<td>V3 = .634 F3 + .773 E3</td>
<td>.402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR_STAT</td>
<td>V4 = 1.000*F1 + .000 E4</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP_KIDS</td>
<td>V5 = .224 F1 + .975 E5</td>
<td>.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCCUPSEG</td>
<td>V10 = .624 F2 + .782 E10</td>
<td>.389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR_WAGET</td>
<td>V18 = -.709*F5 + .705 E18</td>
<td>.502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BENEFITS</td>
<td>V19 = .451 F5 + .893 E19</td>
<td>.203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINC</td>
<td>V20 = .470 F4 + .883 E20</td>
<td>.221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDESEG</td>
<td>V21 = .393*F2 + .920 E21</td>
<td>.154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

JOB EXPERIENCE = F3 = .214*F1 + .177*F2 + .961 D3

TRAINING = F4 = -.427*F3 + .070*F1 + .908 D4

COMPENSATION = F5 = .807*F3 + .976*F4 - .293*F2 + .000 D5

Note: EXOGENOUS FACTORS: FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES = F1; LABOUR MARKET SEGREGATION = F2.
Table 1: Evaluation of Structural Equation Models.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Tool</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parameter estimates</td>
<td>These values represent the amount of change in the predicted variable or construct, as a result of one (standardized) unit of change in the predictor variable/construct, assuming all other predictors constant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fit Indices</td>
<td>These values reflect how closely the data match the hypothesized model. Indices that do not meet the commonly accepted thresholds indicate an unacceptable level of chance of reaching false conclusions. This study uses Hu and Bentler’s (1999) recommendations on the appropriate fit indices: 1) the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) should be greater than or = 0.95 for an adequately fitting model; and 2) the Root Mean Square Effects Approximation (RMSEA) should be less than or = 0.06. A perfect fit would be indicated by a CFI of 1.0 and a RMSEA of 0.0; few models ever achieve a perfect fit.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Hypotheses #1 - 8.
Note: The paths in the figure are numbered to correspond to the hypotheses.
Figure 2: Results of the Model.