Reproductive Labour and the Creation of Value

Mary O'Brien
Ontario Institute for Studies in Education

One of the symptoms of the incipient loss of confidence in intellectual pursuits that is a feature of the age of high technology is a lust on the part of intellectuals to be demonstrably relevant. Thus we read, with sinking hearts, those inevitable little post-scripts to strikingly perishable papers which offer “Indications for further Research” (which will probably never be funded), or “Implications for Policy Making” (which will probably never be implemented), or “the Significance of Replication” (which will probably go on and on). Much of this has to do with the hegemony of positivist methodology and with the assembly line structure of academic careers. Much also has to do with the infatuation with technology itself and the arid and problematic “objectivity” of the philosophy of science which moulds and justifies quantitative occupations. The one bright light of critical creativity penetrating this deceptively restless swamp is that cast by feminology and its increasingly innovative works. Jill McCalla Vickers, in a recent paper, has argued persuasively that the calculation of the quantity of female oppression is an important but limited enterprise: moreover, it is an enterprise conducted within parameters of intellectual enquiry which do not permit the formulation of urgent questions, never mind the provision of politically and culturally useful answers. Vickers joins the progressive feminist quest which not only demands new theory, new method, new practice and, ultimately, a new world, but also demands a radical critique of the standardized assumptions of the modes of enquiry developed by patriarchal science. Just as Mary Daly has led the way in her passionately detached appraisal of the presuppositions about the ability of man’s language to interpret what is real, Vickers launches a critique of such sacred bulls as objectivity itself. Feminist research cannot be an examination of what Daly calls the “non-questions.” Objectivity which objectifies women, takes away agency, ignores women’s cultural achievements and relegates, for example, the process of reproduction to the realm of mute brute nature: such objectivity is not able to describe adequately the experienced world, far less to change it.

A much quoted phrase of Marx’s reminds us that a major critique of positivism has been launched from the Left, and many socialist feminists are active in the attempted renovation of Marxism. To be sure, the 19th century admiration for the scientific informed much of Marx’s own work, and has devitalized much of the research that invokes his authority. There is a methodological aspect to this impoverishment of course. The reduction of the theory of class struggle, for example, to a much less revolutionary “conflict theory” has not proven to be politically exciting nor intellectually fruitful. Further, the substitution of quantitative analysis for dialectical logic has hardly enriched the analytical
WAVE ROCK SERIES #9, Hilda Woolnough, ink drawing 20" x 26," 1974
enterprise. Without a powerful sense of the historic nature of reality, conflict theory tends to become an endless catalogue of the sins of capitalism hermetically sealed off from the creative Marxist notion of praxis. Marxism without dialectical logic is in fact indistinguishable from positivism.

Dialectical logic is, in my view, one of the developments of male-stream thought that may, in a guarded way, be useful in feminological analysis. Many feminists are currently coming to the conclusion that the central and perhaps most damaging tenet of male intellectual buccaneering has been the positing of dualism as the universal essence of male constructions of reality. However, a critique of dualism was precisely the impetus to Hegel and Marx’s development of dialectical analysis. Central to their work was the proposition that history is the product of human transcendence of the contradiction between the natural world and the social world. This is by no means perceived by classical dialectics, idealist or materialist, as permanent. On the contrary, it is a relation which, by its very nature - and “Man” is of nature - calls for active mediation of its oppositions. “Man” understands his dialectical integration with and alienation from nature as a call for mediative praxis, which unifies thought and action in an exercise in control. Thus, in his efforts to mediate his alienated integration with the natural world, “Man” is forced to the activity of controlling that relation conceptually and practically, and of transcending it in the progressive creation of new mediated relations which constitute the form and content of history. For Hegel, history is the temporal unfolding and concretizing of the Spirit of Reason, while for Marx it is the constitution of the social relations in which “Man” works out his appropriation and control of the natural world in the pursuit of economic survival.

The movement of history is, in both cases, a dialectical movement, a cancelling and transcending of the negativity and otherness embedded in the man/nature contradiction. The problem for women is the perception of “Man” as the created and creative Universal in historical struggles. This would not be a problem if “Man” was indeed a semantically slipshod but “really” true universal, that is, as all humanity, but this is not the case for either thinker. Hegel is the more hysterical misogynist of the two, but both of these extraordinary intellects persist in identifying women with nature, which is the mindless, absolutely objective and accidental part of the nature/history/man dialectic. The relation of women to men is not therefore a dialectical contradiction urging humanity to the historical practice of mediation and transcendence: it is ahistorical, outside of history and therefore outside of dialectical process.

The perception of human existence as riven by dualisms has preoccupied Western thought since antiquity: the one and the many, appearance and reality, nature and culture, life and death have all made claims to be the fundamental dualism, though mind and body is perhaps the most significant in the annals of patriarchal ideology. There is, however, much controversy as to the primacy of particular modes of dualism and little agreement as to the origins of dualism. Nature herself, the gods, fate, history, necessity and the structure of mind itself have all been candidates. There is also little agreement as to how dualism can be resolved. Idealists believe that mediation is only possible in meditation and the integration of experience can therefore only be accomplished by philosophical elites on the model of Plato’s Guardians. Over against this idealist dualism, dialectics posits the notion of contradiction. For Marx, contradiction is rooted in necessity and is mediated historically and the greatest of these is class division, arising from the necessity to produce subsistence and mediated in class struggle.

I have argued elsewhere that the substructure of history cannot be rooted arbitrarily in production, for the continuity of the race is a condition
of history. The reproduction of the race, furthermore, stands in the classical form of universal to particular, the dialectical opposition of the reproduction of the species to the sustenance of the individual. Marx actually purloins the word "reproduction" for the latter part of this relation, on the grounds that it is within the social relations of individual survival - namely, the family - that general abstract labour power is concretized in actual, particular labour. The unpaid labour of women which produces this labour power is not, in Marx's schemata, unpaid at all. It is in fact part of the major social factor (in early capitalism, the only social factor) which enters into the calculation of a social wage for labour. The value of labour is the value required to reproduce subsistence on a daily basis and guarantee a future labour force. The capitalist, in purchasing labour power, pays this price and, as far as he is able, not a penny more than bare cost of subsistence to the labourer and his familial dependents on whom the fate of capital depends. This analysis is, of course, the bottom line of the theory of surplus value and its expropriation, and has also become the bottom line in the endeavours of some Marxist feminists to analyze women's oppression as oppression by capital in particular rather than as oppression by men in general.

I do not want to enter these contentious lists here. There is a large literature on the subject, and it is obviously very important in terms of the objective problems associated with female participation in the work force. However, I do not believe that the exploitation of women in the work force can be resolved theoretically or practically wholly within the framework of class struggle within an economic substructure. There is, as there has been throughout recorded history, a gender struggle going on which is both related to and independent of class struggle. Gender struggle simply cannot be understood within either rigidly economist or intransigently idealist constructs.

The enterprise of elaborating the structure of the social relation of reproduction is enormously complex. Here, I want only to take up two aspects of the analysis of reproductive relations in a preliminary way. The first of these is the question of the individual in class society. The second is the question of the creation of value by human reproductive labour.

Historically, socialism, in which consciousness is grounded in class relations, is the antithesis of the Classical Liberal doctrine of individualism, in which consciousness is in the first instance self-consciousness. Liberalism, in its heyday as a revolutionary ideology, based its arguments on the primacy of individual freedom and, indeed, this battle still goes on, as recent responses to the proposed Canadian Bill of Rights show quite clearly. Feminists understand that they are seeking collective rights for women, yet are forced to do so in a framework in which rights are clearly perceived as inhering in the individual. The notion of Natural rights no doubt looked better in the 18th century, when individual rights were a novel departure from the prevailing hierarchical world-view. Today, it is quite clear that liberal individualism is primarily a possessive individualism, and that freedom is perceived as inhering in the mechanics of the marketplaces of the free enterprise system rather than in the actual social relations of production. Freedom, in the liberal view, depends upon the separation of private life and public life, so that the "private enterprise" economy must move historically into the public realm, which is the locus of freedom, leaving the private realm to the intransient necessities of biology and non-freedom, of "mere" use value rather than creative exchange value. In this way, freedom may be considered to be a universal good grounded in political right and untouched by the particular economic privilege of individuals. This contradiction is one which a capitalist ruling class works hard to obscure, even to the extent of bestowing individual rights on women whose "natural" habitat in the private realm...
constrains them from utilizing these rights by active participation in the public realm.

Nonetheless, the contradiction is real, and in fact the private domain plays an important part in the classical perception of men's political freedom and in the practical exercise of male social control. What ameliorates the problematic nature of political freedom standing against the need to impose political obligation and defend economic inequality - the old problem which contract theory failed to solve - is Man's right to absolute freedom in and control of the private domain. Rousseau was the first to see the necessity and possibility of such a development, and to argue, somewhat obliquely, that the non-freedom of women was the pre-condition of the freedom of male citizens. It is thus not at all surprising to see the ideology of liberalism in its dotage appear in the form of conservatism, the so-called new right, desperately hanging on to the realization that freedom in public rests on domestic privation, and fighting strenuously to conserve the forms of private life which it cannot admit that the private enterprise system has in fact destroyed. Just as ancient conservatives like Hesiod and Plato saw women as the destroyers of Man's Golden Age, so latter day conservative liberalism sees feminism as the destructive force attacking the family, that institution which lays the Golden Eggs of suitably socialized wage labourers. Central to this perception of the family, of course, is the mediation of the separation of public and private life and of collective and general interests by male control of reproduction, which provides a "universality" which capitalist economics and liberal politics cannot.

Margaret Stacey and Marion Price have drawn attention to the fact that the major part of the women's struggle in liberal democracies has centred around the struggle for individual civil rights: they also note that this struggle has been successful, but in a very oblique way. The bestowal of individual rights upon women comes from a male-dominated polity which refuses to create the social conditions that would permit women to translate individual rights into collective political power. At the same time, the state, as the instrument of patriarchal and bourgeois power, steadily erodes the private domain, leaving women without their traditional "own place," however unsatisfactory, while it carefully denies them real clout in the public realm. Something similar happens in the Trade Union movement, in education and in other significant social institutions. The denial of reproductive rights in practice, whatever the law says, is also predicated on the notion that "right" belongs in the public realm, while the private realm remains the realm of necessity. Marxism properly emphasized necessity as the ground of the social relations of production, but production, for both liberal and Marxist economics, is the production of exchange value: exchange is the social interaction in which the value of labour is realized. For Marx, "reproduction" is the individual reproduction of abstract social labour, a properly constituted dialectical contradiction which somehow also reproduces the race. The notion of a specific value as a product of reproductive labour is totally absent from male-stream thought.

The whole dualist structure of individual and race is but one shade in the rainbow of dualism which arches over patriarchal understanding of the world. When it is denied, as feminists deny it, for example, in the claim that the personal is political, the age-old separation of public/private is also denied. Small wonder that this seemingly rather naive and indeterminate slogan excites much anguish in the hearts not only of the ruling class, but of the ruling sex. It may not yet be entirely clear what it actually means to say that the personal is political. Obviously it means such things as control of one's personal sexuality and reproductive choice: these are still claimed as individual rights, and early formulations of the notion that the personal is political had a strongly individualistic, do-your-own-thing slant. Feminism is now transcending the extreme
individualism of the 1960s in both theoretical and strategic ways, developing, for example, practical re-arrangements of the domestic responsibilities, claiming new and adequate social systems of child care and domestic labour as political priorities, and organizing constitutional activity around both individual rights and the collective interests of women. Even these relatively modest efforts are radical, as the revival of now conservative liberalism to oppose them powerfully demonstrates. The politics of the personal challenges the doctrine of individual freedom, though it does so in a still confused way. It says in effect that the dogma of individual freedom is a fraud because women are systematically excluded. This upsets liberals. It also says that individual freedom in general is a fraud because patriarchy is universal and oppressive. This upsets Marxists, and upsets them even more when it is further suggested that patriarchy is the main enemy and that sexism must be destroyed before we can even think of the possibility of the elimination of class.

Clearly, the question of the individual and her or his ontological status is allied to these confusing social and political struggles. It is an ontological question precisely because the opposition of individual and community is an a priori of the dualist view of reality which patriarchy has nourished for centuries: the bottom line, as Hannah Arendt argues, of the human condition. Levi-Strauss's structuralism also rises on this foundation; Levi-Strauss argues that it is quite inconsequential what you call this antagonism - he favours nature versus culture - the opposition of Universal and Particular is the ground of all theories and practices of human history. The labyrinth of questions raised by this primordial dualism is a question for intellectual historians. What I have argued is that dualism is neither a primordial nor a sensory nor a theological perception in an a priori sense, but is in fact a specifically masculine reality rooted in the material realities of reproductive process. Reproductive process alienates men from nature at the moment of ejaculation of semen. "Man," reproductively, is Universal only in the most undifferentiated way: any man may have fathered this child. Man is also alienated from the continuity of the generations for, as T.S. Eliot knows, "between the conception and the creation falls the shadow," the shadow presumably of uncertainty and lapsed time. Man can only mediate his alienation from child and species culturally and historically in co-operative action with other men, and this, of course, is precisely what men have done in the actual conversion from kinship organization to rational/legal institutions. Paternity is primordially a conception, an ideology of power over nature divorced from any ensured relation with nature.

Men therefore constitute themselves historically as a - indeed as the - Universal category, and Hegel's argument that women's inferiority inheres precisely in their inability to rise above particularity is nonsense. Insofar as the feminine is particular (this woman - Eve - Mary - Jezebel - the whore of Babylon - you, me) she is particular not by virtue of Natural Law but by virtue of patriarchal theory and practice. This praxis transforms uncertain and alienated paternity to a coherent and powerfully integrated patriarchy; it also transforms the mediative function of reproductive labour power. This labour power, which in fact cancels the contradiction between people and nature, between individual and race, and between past and present: this power is culturally attenuated to a particular, private function taking its generality only from the "uninteresting" realm of biology, and undifferentiated from animal reproductive process in general.

During this long development, in which Adam has consistently abused his divine gift of naming things - which may have been exactly what his metaphysically, non-biologically pro-creating father and judge intended - a cultural and theological complex has arisen to define Man as universal, the participant in public life, the realm of freedom, and to define women as
particular, as denizens only of the private realm, the realm of necessity. It is this complex which feminology now seeks to analyse and feminism seeks to transform. It is not argued here that biological process determines history. It is argued that reproductive process, like productive process, creates the need among the people of the world to set up certain sets of social relations to mediate the contradictions which both realms of necessity generate.

It is in this context, a dialectical context but not recognizably a Marxist context, that we must note the crucial nature of value to both realms.

Marx defines labour as the production of value, but restricts this definition to that interaction of man and the natural world called production and the social definition and measurement of value in the social process of exchange. As far as the labour of reproduction is concerned, as has been noted, this is understood as household work which reproduces abstract labour power in useful form, in capitalism the form of labour as commodity. The problematics of this formulation were never questioned until feminism started to do so in the last few decades. But the actual labour of biological reproduction, the labour which is "labour" to the women who do it, the hard, painful task of producing a new individual and ensuring that the race continues: this magnificent act of mediation is not labour at all, according to male-stream thought. It is involuntary, or has been largely so until recently; it is biologically determined; it is mindless. Above all, it does not create value. This does not mean, of course, that children have no value. It has not even meant that they have not had both use and exchange value. Whatever value the child has, however, is not perceived as a value created by women's reproductive labour, but a value bestowed by generous fathers, spiritual and secular. In liberal ideology it inheres in the individual simply by virtue of his individualism and, if he is male and lucky, by what he inherits from his father in the way of property rights. The confusion of human value and economic value persists in socialism, for the child's human worth will be determined by his class or, millenially, his classlessness. In practice, communism has not let individuals stand in the way of the historical dialectic, yet seems unable to transcend the symbolic and practical representation of individualism found in personality cults of leadership.

I am not advocating that children be equated with commodities: I am arguing that children have a value which is, like all value, produced by human labour. I am not arguing, either, that we should feel more love for our kids, for a fair number of kids do get to be loved. To be sure, feminists need not be afraid of analysing a possible relation between the implicit proposition that reproductive labour produces no value and the violation of human bodies which is the dark underside of patriarchal culture. What must be challenged, however, is not a collection of attitudes and behaviours, but a much deeper strain in which ontology, epistemology and ethics conjoin in male interpretation and control of the world.

Ethics. Norms. Values. Women are rightly suspicious of these concepts, for it is now a truism that ethics are created by the powerful, in terms of both class and gender. "Values," the word with which social science tries to make ethics objective and neutral, have been, historically, the self-interest of the few imposed upon the many. This does not mean that all propositions about the good must be rejected. Moral relativism and moral nihilism are themselves ethical positions. Yet feminism has not embraced these counsels of despair. Feminism has criticized patriarchal values, including the empty veneration of motherhood and the notion that women must somehow fulfill the role of guardians of an ethical system which they have not created. At the same time, feminists have increasingly taken positions on ethical issues, not only in terms of the injustice of women's position, but
in terms of what is seen as patriarchy's inherent lust for violent solutions to political and personal problems. If the personal is political, domestic violence is morally as wrong as imperialist aggression, and the control of nature is perceived by many feminists as immoral when it passes from creative interaction to wanton destruction. There is no logical reason why the relations of nature/history, individual/species, particular/universal should not be mediated by social relations actively and consciously grounded in the integrative mediations of real reproductive labour, rather than in the alienated relations of the idea of paternity.

The word "value" is not in fact neutral: it simply confuses economic and moral value. This no doubt owes much to the conceptual hegemony of the great men of the market place, the ethics of what's good for General Motors being good for all of us. Yet the question of the actual grounding of ethics is one of history's great puzzles. Many ethical propositions share with patriarchy a history much older than capitalism. Many of them in fact are women centred and women created, especially those related to children and personal well-being. This is one reason why they are perceived as pretty but not practical and certainly not binding. I would argue that in fact the proposition that the personal is political is also an argument that the person is moral. This would simply be an arbitrary pronouncement if it were not able to posit a material grounding for moral positions. The use of the word value in its double sense suggests one possible way of dealing with this. Value is in fact social, even where divine inspiration is adduced. Social value is created by labour. If this is true of productive value, why should it not be true of reproductive value? What, then, is the value created by reproductive labour?

It is a value which I have called, tentatively, synthetic value. Unlike imposed value systems, it does not perceive value in a dualist way, for the reproductive labour of women is essentially meditative and integrative. The birth of the child is obviously an alienation of a material nature as specific as the alienation of the male seed. The difference is, of course, that the latter is ideologically and culturally mediated by man, while the former is mediated, as all transcendent mediations must be, by human labour, women's labour. The two-sidedness of patriarchal notions of value - the material, quantifiable, exchangeable economic value over against the abstract, qualitative fixed ethical value - presents material value as concrete and more desirable in practice, if not in rhetoric. The system of moral values which is predicated on material gain is clearly immensely problematic where the universal creation of value by labour power is wilfully delimited by the political and economic control of the appropriating few. Nonetheless, in any conceivable form of economic relations, what has to be mediated by men and women alike is the actual separation of the human and natural world.

Reproductive labour has a quite different mediation to perform and a quite different value to produce. The dialectical contradictions which reproductive labour mediates and synthesises are the separation of the generations, which is a temporal mediation and as such the substructure of history, and the generic contradiction, the gap between male alienation from and female integration with reproductive process, which is the ground of the social relations of reproduction. The dialectical relation of production and reproduction is simply not visible under historical circumstances in which reproduction appears as involuntary and accidental. Just as technology historically transforms means of production, so contraceptive technology, currently about as sophisticated as the water wheel, renders the actual dialectical and historical dimension of reproductive process visible and thus subject to analysis. Likewise, the question of the value of both individual and genetic life takes on a moral dimension: not "what is one life worth?", not "do we regard the survival of the race as a moral good rather than a random act of natural selec-
tion?”, but a realization that these are ultimately the same question.

This is a question of the value of Be-ing as such, the challenge to the ontological exile of women of which Vickers speaks. It is the root of her perception of methodological revolt by women, for we do not have the analytical tools to deal with it. I have posed the question here in dialectical terms, but have quite unrepentantly bent those terms to encompass female experience in a way that male dialecticians will no doubt deride. Meanwhile, they persist in strategies of control of the natural world, including the minds and bodies of women and children, rather than pursuing a politics of integration founded on the synthesis of people and nature which is materially mediated by the creation of life-creating value by reproductive labour. The derision comes with the historical and ideological package which feminology now has the task of transcending. It is a frighteningly difficult task, but no more so than the female task of transcending natural and cultural blocks to species continuity which women have been battling for a very long time indeed.

The ultimate value created by reproductive labour is human life itself: life in all the dialectical complexity of individual and community. The cultural expression of the value of life has not been made by the women whose labour power creates it: it has been made by an alienated sex who have invented such bizarre notions as the cheapness of life, death as true birth, the individualist ideology of the self-made man and the existential void which gobbles up those who have forgotten that they are the products of reproductive labour. They prefer to think of themselves as “fallen” into the world, like Heidegger’s Dasein. They do not in fact fall from eternity into time, for these two dimensions are mediated in women’s reproductive labour.

Nonetheless, “life” is merely another abstraction if we do not give it social substance, and define the dimensions of its value in concrete ways. On a much more pragmatic level, for example, I would argue that human life has a value only insofar as it is the product of reproductive labour, and it therefore makes no sense to speak of a fetus as a person. No human labour, no value. I would also argue that the ancient equality debate can be conducted more rigorously within a materialist formulation of the social relations of reproduction. The human value imbued in each of us is not only a personal value, but a species value conferred by the socially mediative and creative character of reproductive labour.

In other words, I would recommend that feminism elaborate a value system which is grounded in the materiality of labour-created value, which is life centred in terms of individual and race, which clarifies new, vibrant and ethical social relations of reproduction, and understands such relations in opposition to and integration with the dialectically structured relations of production as the essential substructure of our past and of our future.

NOTES


4. Vickers’ paper elaborates the critique of positivism and the feminist methodological rebellion in a very trenchant way.

5. For a discussion of this struggle in a Canadian context, see Charles Taylor, The Pattern of Politics (Toronto/Montreal, 1970), but see also the disappointing innocuousness of Taylor’s strategic recommendations (Chapter 7). For a critique of ‘left’ structuralism and idealist reductionism, see E.P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory.

6. See, for example, the much criticized ‘conflict’ interpretation of education by Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America (New York, 1976).

7. For a recent scholarly and provocative comparison of Hegel and Marx’s method of dealing with this opposition, see G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence (Princeton, 1980), pp. 2-27. Cohen catches well (but does not comment upon) the sense in which historical dialectics builds upon reproductive process but appropriates it for men. Speaking of Hegel’s ‘world-historical’ figure, Cohen says, correctly, that
for Hegel a great man is "...a midwife assisting at the birth of a fresh conception of man. His insight tells him of the pregnancy of the time, but he never learns the full significance of what he delivers." (p. 19).

8. Hegel's characterization of male as universal and female as particular appears in his earliest writings, notably "The System of Ethical Life," currently being prepared in translation by T.M. Knox and H.S. Harris for publication by S.U.N.Y. Press. Also important is the early fragment "On Love" in Knox's translation, Early Theological Writings (Chicago, 1948). An interest in biological reproduction appears to be a youthful diversion for philosophers: Marx's major treatment is in the Third of the 1844 Manuscripts. For a fuller treatment of these works, see Mary O'Brien, The Politics of Reproduction (London/Boston, 1981), Chapters 1 and 5.


11. Domestic labour becomes the only possible category for analysis of gender differentiation. For discussion and annotated bibliography see Bonnie Fox (ed.) Hidden in The Household: Women's Domestic Labour Under Capitalism (Toronto, 1980).


13. In Rousseau's work, the gap between "natural" freedom (The Second Discourse) and political freedom (The Social Contract) is to be mediated by education (Emile). Rousseau's romanticism has a pragmatic underpinning, and he recognizes the need to care for subsistence needs as well as the responsibilities and rewards of citizenship. Thus, women make a gift of their natural freedom to their husbands so that men's biological needs can be met and paternity certified (J.J. Rousseau, Emile, translated by Barbara Foxley (London, 1911), p. 324). See The Politics of Reproduction.


16. These are qualitatively different projects, which is one reason why gender struggle is not analogous to class struggle: the latter proposes to abolish class, the former to abolish patriarchy. While many leftists contemplate with equanimity and even relish the "abolition" of selected bourgeoisie, few feminists recommend the abolition of the male sex. How we are to abolish patriarchy is a complex question, and precisely the area where what I have called feminology can be most useful to feminism.


19. This terminology was used tentatively by Ricardo and more confidently by Proudhon in an attempt to express the elusive property in some products (e.g. works of art) which do not appear to have a concrete relation to labour time. Marx demolishes Proudhon's argument in The Poverty of Philosophy (New York, 1963), pp. 43-50.